Climate Change, Inequality, and Human Migration by Burzynski, Michal et al.
HAL Id: hal-02394518
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02394518
Submitted on 4 Dec 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Climate Change, Inequality, and Human Migration
Michal Burzynski, Christoph Deuster, Frédéric Docquier, Jaime de Melo
To cite this version:
Michal Burzynski, Christoph Deuster, Frédéric Docquier, Jaime de Melo. Climate Change, Inequality,
and Human Migration. 2019. ￿hal-02394518￿
fondation pour les études et recherches sur le développement international
LA
 F
ER
D
I E
ST
 U
N
E 
FO
N
D
AT
IO
N
 R
EC
O
N
N
U
E 
D
’U
TI
LI
TÉ
 P
U
BL
IQ
U
E.
EL
LE
 M
ET
 E
N
 Œ
U
V
RE
 A
V
EC
 L
’ID
D
RI
 L
’IN
IT
IA
TI
V
E 
PO
U
R 
LE
 D
ÉV
EL
O
PP
EM
EN
T 
ET
 L
A
 G
O
U
V
ER
N
A
N
C
E 
M
O
N
D
IA
LE
 (I
D
G
M
).
EL
LE
 C
O
O
RD
O
N
N
E 
LE
 L
A
BE
X
 ID
G
M
+
 Q
U
I L
’A
SS
O
C
IE
 A
U
 C
ER
D
I E
T 
À
 L
’ID
D
RI
.
C
ET
TE
 P
U
BL
IC
AT
IO
N
 A
 B
ÉN
ÉF
IC
IÉ
 D
’U
N
E 
A
ID
E 
D
E 
L’
ÉT
AT
 F
RA
N
C
A
IS
 G
ÉR
ÉE
 P
A
R 
L’A
N
R 
A
U
 T
IT
RE
 D
U
 P
RO
G
RA
M
M
E 
«I
N
V
ES
TI
SS
EM
EN
TS
 D
’A
V
EN
IR
» 
PO
RT
A
N
T 
LA
 R
ÉF
ÉR
EN
C
E 
«A
N
R-
10
-L
A
BX
-1
4-
01
».
Climate Change, Inequality, and 
Human Migration *
Michal Burzynski | Christoph Deuster
Frederic Docquier | Jaime de Melo
Michal Burzynski, LISER, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research 
(Luxembourg). michal.burzynski@liser.lu
Abstract
This paper investigates the long-term implications of climate change on local, interregional, 
and international migration of workers. For nearly all of the world’s countries, our micro-
founded model jointly endogenizes the effects of changing temperature and sea level on 
income distribution and individual decisions about fertility, education, and mobility. Climate 
change intensifies poverty and income inequality creating favorable conditions for urbanization 
and migration from low- to high- latitude countries. Encompassing slow- and fast-onset 
mechanisms, our projections suggest that climate change will induce the voluntary and forced 
displacement of 100 to 160 million workers (200 to 300 million climate migrants of all ages) over 
the course of the 21st century. However, under current migration laws and policies, forcibly 
displaced people predominantly relocate within their country and merely 20% of climate 
migrants opt for long-haul migration to OECD countries. If climate change induces generalized 
and persistent conflicts over resources in regions at risk, we project significantly larger cross-
border flows in the future. 
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1 Introduction
How will long-term climate change (henceforth CLC) affect human mobility over the
course of the 21st century? This question has been the source of much controversy in
recent literature and has gained unprecedented attention in public discourse as global
warming projections for the coming decades get worse.1 Anthropogenic temperature
changes and sea level rise constitute two major threats of CLC envisaged by climatologists
(Stocker et al., 2013). Moreover, CLC manifests itself through increased frequency and
intensity of both extreme weather events and natural disasters (Stott, 2016). Along with
altering ecosystems, CLC is expected to drastically affect numerous economic outcomes,
such as labor productivity, individual health, and regional conflicts over resources (Dell
et al., 2014). Modeling and predicting the consequences of these phenomena for economic
prosperity and human mobility is a complex task, as climate-specific factors are often
difficult to isolate from other determinants of migration and development. Scant evidence
from the past suggests that the scale and type of mobility responses to CLC are highly
uncertain and context-specific.2
Damages resulting from CLC will vary across space for two reasons. First, regions
are heterogeneously exposed to sea level rise. Second, the economic effects of changes in
temperature will vary across industries and by latitude, as the relationship between tem-
perature and productivity is sector-specific and nonlinear (i.e., the effects are dependent
on current levels of temperature). Low-latitude countries in general, and their agricultural
sectors in particular, have contributed the least to CLC but will be the most adversely
affected. Many believe that CLC will likely trigger mass emigration from developing to
developed countries, as human mobility is often considered a first-order adaptation mech-
anism to CLC. This paper provides a quantitative economic evaluation of the size and
composition of these CLC-induced migration flows.
To estimate the mobility responses to CLC, we set up a dynamic model of the world
economy that builds on the state-of-the-art developments in migration literature. We
model migration decisions as an outcome of a micro-founded, random utility maximization
(RUM) model, which jointly accounts for the main migration mechanisms highlighted in
the recent literature. In particular, changes in the mean level and volatility of temperature
1There is strong evidence that the global mean surface temperature of the world and the sea level
have already increased since the beginning of the 19th century (by +0.9◦ Celsius and by +0.2 meters,
respectively), and that the process has intensified since 1980. Climatologists estimate that temperatures
might increase by 1 to 3◦ Celsius over the 21st century, and recent studies suggest that, once adding an
increment from storm surge, the sea level is expected to rise 1 to 2 meters by 2050 (e.g., Rigaud et al.,
2018).
2For example, Fagan (2008) documents that a 2◦ Celsius rise in temperature during the Medieval warm
period between the 9th and the 14th century resulted in a large relocation of people and a reshaping of
economic activity. It is, of course, hard to extrapolate these conclusions to the present day.
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affect expected income and incentives to migrate (as in Dallmann and Millock, 2017;
Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015; Shayegh, 2017). The associated sea level rise forces
people and firms to move (as in Desmet et al., 2018b; Rigaud et al., 2018). CLC is also
likely to stir refugee crises by provoking conflicts over resources (as in Abel et al., 2019;
Burke et al., 2015b).
Compared to existing studies, our framework presents six main advantages. Firstly,
the RUM structure allows us to model the long-term mobility responses to CLC at various
spatial scales, taking into account the interplay between alternative forms of migration,
namely local (i.e., very-short-distance), rural-to-urban (i.e., short-distance), and inter-
national (here captured by long-haul migration to the OECD countries). Secondly, it
accounts for the high degree of heterogeneity in migratory behavior between people of
different places of origin and levels of education. In our framework, each country is
populated by two types of agents (college graduates and the less educated) living in two
regions (agricultural and non-agricultural) that are heterogeneously affected by sea level
rise (flooded and non-flooded areas). Thirdly, it allows us to distinguish between forced
displacement (linked to sea level rise and conflicts) and voluntary migration (driven by
economic incentives). Fourthly, the deterministic part of our RUM model is itself an out-
come of a (second-stage) utility-maximization problem over consumption, fertility, and
education. Consequently, we allow CLC to affect the dynamics of the size and structure
of populations in an overlapping generation (OLG) setup. Fifthly, these endogenous mi-
gration decisions are embedded into a general equilibrium framework. The effects of CLC
on human mobility, population growth, global income inequality, and extreme poverty
are, therefore, jointly determined. Finally, the parameters of the RUM model (reflecting
all legal barriers as well as the private monetary and psychic costs of moving) can be
calibrated to exactly match international mobility and urbanization data from the last 30
years. Relying on simpler frameworks and ignoring CLC, the backcast exercises conducted
in Dao et al. (2018) and Burzyn´ski et al. (2019) demonstrate that such a model accurately
fits the past migration trends and generates sensible projections. This provides us with
some confidence that our approach can suitably predict the long-term consequences of
CLC.
The first set of simulations focuses on slow-onset mechanisms; we account for foresee-
able climate-related productivity losses and forced displacement induced by sea level rise.
We find that CLC induces small positive effects on the worldwide average level of income
per worker. However, the global distribution of income becomes more unequal due to
CLC. Workers employed in countries located between the north and south 35th paral-
lels suffer income losses, particularly those employed in agriculture. CLC also increases
extreme poverty around the world at both the extensive and intensive margins. Thus,
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CLC creates conditions that are conducive to increasing urbanization and international
migration. Relative to the state of the world with no CLC and under current migration
laws and policies, the worldwide number of working-age movers is projected to increase by
100 to 160 million during the 21st century, depending on the intensity of CLC.3 Overall,
we find similar levels of climate migration to Rigaud et al. (2018), but we offer additional
insight on the type and spatial structure of mobility responses. Firstly, in our median
scenario, we find that 60% to 70% of these climate migrants will be forcibly displaced
due to sea level rise. Secondly, far more climate migrants will move within their own
countries than across borders: 60% of movers will relocate within their region of origin
(from flooded to non-flooded areas) and 18% migrate interregionally (from rural areas
to cities). Hence, only 22% will opt for long-haul migration to an OECD destination
country. Depending on its magnitude, CLC will lead to a 20- to 50-million increase in
the number of international adult migrants over the whole century, which translates into
a 7- to 17-million average variation in the stock of migrants worldwide. For the median
scenario, the induced 7 million migrants per year corresponds to 0.2% of the world pop-
ulation, 1/20 of the no-CLC worldwide migration rate, and 1/5 of the gradual increase
predicted for the 21st century.4
The second set of simulations accounts for fast-onset mechanisms. We link the evo-
lution of the distribution of temperatures to health costs, labor productivity losses, and
natural disasters. Despite the fact that fast-onset variables deepen extreme poverty and
income inequality, we find that they increase the stock of international migrants by only
6 million. Overall, when focusing on traditional economic mechanisms, the predicted
impact of CLC on future international migration pressures is limited.
Results become significantly larger when accounting for conflicts over resources. Burke
et al. (2015b) and Abel et al. (2019) argue that the effect of CLC on conflict occurrence is
particularly relevant for countries undergoing political transformation or poverty crises.
Building on these two studies, we simulate a climate-related persistent conflict in seven
Western Asian countries and in ten countries with significant levels of poverty. This
simulation increases the projected number of international climate migrants by about
50 million over the 21st century, and the long-run proportion of international migrants
by 0.5 percentage points. Without tight security policies, we conclude that the conflict
channel is likely to increase future migration pressures, leading to severe climate-related
humanitarian crises.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on the links between CLC and mi-
3This roughly implies 200-300 million migrants of all ages.
4The latter trend is mostly driven by the differential in population growth between developing and
developed countries, and by acquisition of education all over the world.
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gration. Recent reviews of the literature are provided in Perch-Nielsen et al. (2008),
Piguet et al. (2011), Millock (2015), Berlemann and Steinhardt (2017) or Cattaneo et al.
(2019).5 The literature has mostly looked at the short-term impact of fast-onset variables
(e.g., weather anomalies, storms, hurricanes, torrential rains, floods, landslides, etc.), as
opposed to long-run CLC or slow-onset variables (e.g., temperature trends, desertifica-
tion, rising sea level, coastal erosion, etc.). Methodological diversity is reflected in the
heterogeneity of findings. The meta-analysis in Beine and Jeusette (2018) identifies four
important methodological choices governing the results.6
While CLC has consistently emerged as a potent driver of internal migration (Barrios
et al., 2006; Dallmann and Millock, 2017; Henderson et al., 2017; Kubik and Maurel, 2016;
Piguet et al., 2011), its effect on international migration is not consensual. Some studies
find important international migration outflows that are directly associated with weather
shocks (Backhaus et al., 2015; Cai et al., 2016; Coniglio and Pesce, 2015) or indirectly
induced by CLC-driven pressures on living standards in urban areas (Beine and Parsons,
2015; Marchiori et al., 2012, 2017). Others attempt to explain why migration responses to
climate shocks have been small, non-existent, or even negative (Black et al., 2013, 2011;
Cattaneo et al., 2019).7 Overall, using empirical approaches to predict the migration
responses to global warming poses three major problems. Firstly, identifying a clear-cut
effect of CLC on migration is difficult as climate variables closely interact with other
economic and political drivers of migration. Secondly, mobility decisions are context-
specific and can be influenced by a large number of factors that vary across regions and
countries (such as the country’s size, the level of economic development, political situation,
migrants’ networks or specific cultural characteristics). Thirdly, the predicted effects of
CLC have barely started to materialize. Long-run extrapolation of existing estimates is
5Earlier studies show that millions of people will migrate in the future as a result of climate change
(Gemenne, 2011; Piguet et al., 2011). In response to the diversity of findings across studies, the paradigm
has gradually changed, with recent studies seeing migration as one adaptation strategy among many (and
not the least costly one).
6The first is the measurement of the dependent variable. Some studies focus on international migration
(to all countries or to selected destinations) while others tackle internal migration and urbanization
(Henderson et al., 2017). The second is the decision to include or exclude indirect effects of CLC. An
indirect link is identified when climate variables affect mobility decisions through other variables, such
as changes in productivity and income (Beine and Parsons, 2015; Marchiori et al., 2012) or conflicts
over resources (Gleditsch, 2012; Miguel et al., 2004). The third is the analytical specification of the
transmission technology. The literature distinguishes between monotonic or unconditional specifications
(i.e., models capturing responses that are independent of the context) and conditional specifications that
allow the eventual outcome to depend on socioeconomic and political characteristics of the individuals,
households or regions exposed to climatic events. Finally, the fourth is the identification strategy.
7Cattaneo and Peri (2016) report that a gradual increase in the level of temperature reduces migration
outflows from poor countries due to the presence of financial constraints. Bazzi (2017) finds similar results
for Indonesia, as does Findley (1994) for Mali. On the contrary, Jayachandran (2006), Gray and Mueller
(2012), and Mueller et al. (2014) find that landless households respond more strongly than wealthy ones
in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively.
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questionable, and there are insufficient theoretical insights on the consequences of CLC.
In light of these limitations, we propose an alternative, micro-founded model that
accounts for between- and within-country heterogeneity in mobility responses to CLC.
Our study is a part of an incipient literature pioneered by Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg
(2015) (henceforth DRH), who investigate the economic costs of CLC by modeling the
interaction of mobility and production changes in the “almost continuous” space.8 Un-
like DRH, we assume that each economy is composed of two regions, agricultural and
non-agricultural; this assumption allows us to accommodate empirical estimates, which
consistently suggest that CLC’s impact on productivity will be greater on agriculture
than on manufacturing. We are looking for first-order effects of CLC on individuals and
countries in a framework that takes into account the fact that the (endogenous) geogra-
phy of skills affects migration choices through differences in incentives, fertility decisions,
and migration costs. Another related study is Shayegh (2017), which models the effect of
CLC on fertility rates, income inequality and human capital accumulation in developing
countries. He assumes that the probability of emigration is skill-specific and increasing
with temperature without microfoundations. As to the effects of CLC, DRH and Shayegh
(2017) model the effect of the change in temperature on productivity. Compared to these
studies, we use an improved migration technology that combines the six advantages listed
above, including an excellent predictive power for the period 1980 to 2010; we also account
for sea level rise, which affects countries differentially, and implement additional mech-
anisms of transmission, such as the costs of natural disasters, health and productivity
effects of heat waves, and conflicts over resources.
Our model inevitably leaves out a number of relevant features of CLC. Unlike the
macro models of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and DRH, CO2 emissions are exogenously
subsumed in the simulation scenario rather than being a result of explicitly modelled
mitigation decisions. One reason for this is that the effects of population change on
greenhouse gases concentration and global mean temperature are highly uncertain. In ad-
dition, for a given emissions scenario, projections of mean air temperature levels strongly
vary across climate models.9 We assume that CLC and its direct impacts are exoge-
nous to the economies under investigation. We also disregard the potential mitigation
costs underlying the differences between our climate scenarios. Our results will remain
unchanged if these costs involve universal taxes that are proportional to income. Fur-
thermore, we model internal migration and long-haul migration to OECD countries only,
8In DRH all equilibria are spatially symmetric with prices and factor allocations identical for all
locations at a given latitude. Desmet et al. (2018b) model the mobility of people and the dynamics of
income inequality at a more detailed spatial scale (1x1 degree cells across the globe), but disregard CLC.
9Shayegh (2017) shows that endogenizing the CLC response to migration has a negligible impact on
the overall results given the small number of migrants relative to the whole population.
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leaving aside South-South international mobility. This is because South-South migration
mostly involves movements between contiguous countries, which will be affected by simi-
lar long-term CLC trends. South-South mobility is likely to increase with the frequency
of asymmetric weather shocks. These movements are likely to be temporary and to bal-
ance out in the long run, given the spatial autocorrelation in climate shocks. Abstracting
from all these features makes our results necessarily somewhat stylized. They should be
interpreted as baseline estimates of the migration responses to first-order effects of CLC
on living standards, livable space and political instability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our climate damage
functions and illustrates the heterogeneous implications that CLC induces for the world
economy. Section 3 describes the two-sector, two-education-groups model used to predict
the behavioral and market responses to CLC. Section 4 presents the results obtained
under various scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
2 Climate Damage Functions
Before accounting for general equilibrium and behavioral responses to CLC (see Section
3), this section describes CLC trends and their economic implications. It also discusses
why low-latitude countries in general, and their rural regions in particular, will be the
most adversely affected by CLC. In Section 2.1, we define CLC scenarios that combine
future variations in global temperature and sea level. Then, Section 2.2 discusses the
transmission channels through which CLC affects the world economy and the people’s
migration decisions.
In the first set of simulations (see Section 4.1), we focus on two slow-onset mecha-
nisms: changes in total factor productivity (TFP) driven by long-term variations in mean
temperature, and forced displacements driven by the rise in the sea level. Slow-onset
mechanisms are easier to anticipate and are more likely to induce adaptation strategies
such as crop switching and migration. Despite this, it is worth noting that there is a huge
level of uncertainty in constructing our TFP damage functions.10 Hence, as detailed in
10Most analysts predict that CLC will lead to a gradual rise in the mean surface-temperature and
in the sea level over the 21st century. However, the effects of CO2 emissions on the exact magnitudes
of global temperature and sea level remain unexplored. Stern (2013) reports that since an increase of
+3◦ Celsius has not been experienced for around 3 million years, we are in uncharted territory when it
comes to modeling these likely effects (which are expected when the concentration of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere increases from the current 400ppm to 750ppm). He lists the effects that might emerge
strongly at +3◦ Celsius. Schelling (2007) discusses the climate sensitivity parameter (S), which defines
the equilibrium surface warming from a doubling of the stock of CO2 emissions. He concludes that “for a
quarter of a century, the range of uncertainty [about S] has been a factor of 3”. Potential damages induced
by the same warming scenario across different climate models are subject to even more uncertainty, as
reviewed by Burke et al. (2015a).
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Section 2.1, we consider three long-term CLC scenarios referred to as:
• CLC-Minimalist : +0.09◦ Celsius in global average temperature and +0m in sea
level over the 21st century. Most likely unattainable, this scenario serves as the
non-CLC reference.
• CLC-Intermediate: +2.09◦ Celsius in global average temperature and +1.1m rise
in sea level, which corresponds to the median scenario of the World Bank. In
this scenario, these country- and region-specific shocks would affect the worldwide
distribution of TFP and induce forced displacements due to the rising sea level.
• CLC-Maximalist : +4.09◦ Celsius in global average temperature and +1.3m in sea
level. This scenario would induce larger productivity effects and more displacement
due to the rising sea level.
In the second set of simulations (see Section 4.2), we account for additional mecha-
nisms related to fast-onset climate shocks. We will consider the costs induced by natural
disasters, the productivity and health costs due to high temperature and heat waves, and
conflicts over resources. As these fast-onset shocks account for phenomena that are local,
volatile, and generically hard to anticipate, they are more likely to induce severe income
losses and additional mobility responses.
2.1 Climate Scenarios
As stated above, we consider CLC as exogenous in our model. We thus disregard the en-
dogeneity of CLC, which involves uncertain links between economic activities and policies,
CO2 emissions, and the resulting changes in temperature.
Projections of temperature. We follow three steps to construct our projections of
global temperature distribution. In a first step, we collect raw data on monthly temper-
ature levels and projections from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) of the
World Bank Group. Our variable of interest is the near-surface monthly mean air tem-
perature level. In Appendix A.1, we discuss how raw temperature levels are adjusted to
account for within-country disparities in temperature and population density and how cli-
mate windows are linked to the time periods of our overlapping generations model. The
left panel of Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between mean surface-temperature in
2010 (plotted on the horizontal axis) and latitude of the countries included in our sample
(plotted on the vertical axis). Label sizes are proportional to the logarithm of working-age
population in each of the 179 countries included in the model. Unsurprisingly, current
temperature levels are negatively correlated with latitude.
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Notes: Latitude (geographic coordinate) is measured on the Y-axis, the size of country labels is pro-
portional to the logarithm of population aged 25 to 64 in 2010, while the darkness of country labels is
inversely proportional to GDP per capita in 2010. Solid black lines represent fitted polynomials of degree
four.
Figure 1: Observed Temperatures and its Predicted Deviations between 2010 and 2100
As for temperature projections, they are organized in 20-year climatological windows
for 2020 to 2039, 2040 to 2059, 2060 to 2079, and 2080 to 2099. The CCKP projec-
tions are obtained from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5)
distribution (Taylor et al., 2012), which distinguishes between several scenarios for the
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) (Moss et al., 2010). The median-emission
scenario is called RCP-4.5. In addition, for each RCP, the CCKP provides data for 16
models obtained from different research institutes. When these models are ranked in
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ascending order according to the yearly temperature anomaly for the 2080 to 2099 cli-
matological window, the medium resolution model of the Institute Pierre Simon Laplace
(the ipsl cm5a mr variant) takes the 8th (median) position in RCP-4.5. We select this
ipsl cm5a mr variant as our Intermediate scenario.
This Intermediate scenario predicts that the temperature levels will continue to in-
crease gradually in virtually all countries and that the mean surface temperature of the
world will increase by 2.09◦ Celsius during the 21st century. The right panel of Figure 1
plots the 2010 to 2100 deviations in the yearly average temperature by latitude for the 179
countries. For almost all countries, this difference takes a positive value between 0◦ and 4◦
Celsius. Overall, the correlation between latitude and the predicted temperature change
is small, except in the highest latitude areas. Hence, most countries will experience an
increase in temperature (an average of +2.09◦ Celsius) and all country types (small and
large, rich and poor) will be affected with a similar intensity.
In the Minimalist scenario, we start from the Intermediate and uniformly decrease
the temperature levels in 2100 by 2◦ Celsius in all countries, which basically shifts the
estimated curve in the right panel of Figure 1 by 2◦ Celsius to the left. Hence, this scenario
predicts that the mean surface temperature will increase by 0.09◦ Celsius over the course
of the 21st century, virtually implying the absence of global warming. The Minimalist
scenario roughly corresponds to the most optimistic variant under RCP-2.6.
In contrast, the Maximalist scenario uniformly increases the temperature levels in
2100 by 2◦ Celsius in all countries, which shifts the estimated curve by 2◦ Celsius to the
right. Hence, it predicts that the mean surface-temperature will increase by 4.09◦ Celsius.
The Maximalist scenario roughly corresponds to the median variant under RCP-8.5.
Sea level rise (SLR). The second impact of long-term CLC is the rise in the sea level.11
According to IPCC (2014), millions of individuals living at an altitude of less than one
meter will be affected during the 21st century. Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009) developed a
methodology that links global SLR to global mean temperature on time scales of decades
to centuries. They estimate the SLR for each global temperature scenario of IPCC (2014),
which involves a global temperature change above 2◦ Celsius. The estimated relationship
between the sea level variation and the global change in the mean surface-temperature
(∆T ) is concave if SLR is forced to be equal to zero for ∆T = 0, and almost linear if
SLR(0) is not specified.12
11This abstracts from ecological damage, loss of biodiversity and perturbation of habitats.
12Based on past data, SLR is very well predicted using a log-linear function: SLR = 0.89+0.3 ln(∆T );
the R-squared of this regression equals 0.985. The shape of the function and the proxied observations are
depicted in Figure A.1b in the Appendix. We use this function to predict future SLR, although there is
no guarantee that the relationship will remain concave or linear in the future.
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In the Intermediate temperature scenario (+2.09◦ Celsius), this curve implies that the
sea level is expected to rise by 1.1m in 2100. Given the gradual change in temperature in
our baseline scenario, the sea level is predicted to rise by 0.78m in 2040 and by 0.99m in
2070. In another study, DeConto and Pollard (2016) model the impact of the Antarctic ice
cap on overall SLR. In their reference estimation, they find changes that closely correspond
to our projections: under the RCP-4.5 scenario, they predict a mean elevation of 1.05m
and a confidence interval of ±0.30m, which is very similar to our Intermediate scenario.
In the Minimalist scenario, we assume a constant sea level which, coupled with the
assumption of constant mean surface temperature, generates an overly optimistic scenario.
It serves as our no-CLC point of reference. In the Maximalist scenario, the projected
increase in average temperature by 4.09◦ Celsius yields a 1.3m SLR by 2100 (0.97m in
2040 and 1.18m in 2070), according to the methodology of Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009).
Uncertainty about SLR is large because the dynamics of ocean heat uptake as well as
the creation and decay of ice sheets and glaciers are poorly understood. Until recently,
climate models have been unable to replicate the estimated sea level swings reconstructed
from geological data during the Pliocene (about 100,000 years ago); at this time the
concentration of CO2 was about the same as now, temperatures were 0
◦ to 2◦ Celsius
higher than today, and the sea level was 6 to 9m higher.13 Rigaud et al. (2018) predict a
sea level rise of 2m for 2050 in their benchmark scenario. For the purpose of comparison,
we also consider more extreme scenarios concerning SLR in Section 4.
2.2 Channels of Transmission
The “damage function” is central for estimating the economic implications of global tem-
perature and sea level variations in our first-step projections. Two channels of trans-
mission are systematically accounted for in our simulations. Firstly, we allow changes in
temperature to affect the level of TFP in agricultural and in non-agricultural sectors.14
Secondly, SLR induces forced displacements of people. This leads to substantial costs as
13DeConto and Pollard (2016) have calibrated the sea level swings of the Pliocene, projecting an
increase in the sea level above 1m in 2100. They estimate that the Antarctica ice sheet cannot be saved
even with extraordinary success in cutting emissions. This would lead to a locking of the sea level rise of
more than 5m.
14In unreported results, we also account for the potential productivity losses due to the rising sea
level. We use the NASA database and estimate of the fraction of land that could be flooded. Using
population and land data, we compare the density of people in flood-risk areas and in the rest of the
region and assume, in line with Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2015), that disparities in population density
reflect disparities in total factor productivity. For each country, we produce region-specific estimates of
the productivity loss caused by the sea level rise. These productivity losses are small (in countries with
access to the sea, we obtained an average loss of 1.2% in urban regions and of 0.7% in rural regions), either
because the share of population located in flooded areas is small, or because productivity differences are
small. For this reason, this mechanism is not included in the model.
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flooded areas are usually the most densely populated parts of many region.15 In a second
step, we consider additional channels of transmission related to fast-onset variables and
to conflicts over resources.
Temperature and productivity. To model the effect of temperature, we follow DRH,
who estimate an inverted-U-shaped relationship between temperature (T ) and total factor
productivity in agricultural and manufacturing sectors. They include a quadratic scale
factor Gr(T ) in the TFP of sector r that depends on the level of temperature. It can be
expressed as:
Gr(T ) = max
{
g0r + g1rT + g2rT
2; 0
}
where (g0r, g1r, g2r) is a triplet of sector-specific parameters, and r = (a, n) denotes agri-
culture (a) and non-agriculture (n). If g1r > 0 and g2r < 0, the ideal temperature in
sector r is given by T ∗r = −g1r/2g2r. The level of TFP increases with temperature in
regions with average temperature below T ∗r ; it decreases with temperature in warmer
regions.
Agronomic studies have been used to calibrate the quadratic relationship between
TFP and temperature in agriculture (Lobell and Burke, 2010; Mendelsohn et al., 1994).
To account for the possibility of adapting to climate change by switching between crops,
DRH estimate the envelope of the quadratic relationships obtained for different crops.
This gives (g0a, g1a, g2a) = (−2.24, 0.308,−0.0073), which implies an optimal temperature
T ∗a of 21.1
◦ Celsius. It also imposes that agricultural yields are nil when temperature
Ta is below 9.4
◦ Celsius or greater than 32.9◦ Celsius. The top panel of Figure 2 shows
the relationship between temperature and agricultural productivity (in solid gray line),
after fitting Ga(T ) with a Gaussian function to avoid negative productivity levels. The
maximal productivity level is normalized to one.
To estimate the quadratic relationship in the non-agricultural sector, DRH use data
on population density (a proxy for economic development) by latitude. They consider
1,000 bands of 9.6km each, and estimate the relationship between (smoothed) levels of
population density and temperature. They obtain (g0n, g1n, g2n) = (0.3, 0.08,−0.0023),
which gives an optimal temperature T ∗n of 17.4
◦ Celsius. The quadratic relationship
is compatible with the findings of Dell et al. (2014), who show that industrial output
decreases by 2% for a 1◦ Celsius increase in temperature; it is also compatible with
specialization and trade patterns by level of latitude. Although the curve is flatter than in
agriculture, non-agricultural productivity is nil when temperature Tn is below −3◦ Celsius
or above 38◦ Celsius. The dashed line in the top panel of Figure 2 shows the relationship
15On average, low elevation coastal zones (situated at an altitude of less than ten meters) account for
2.2% of dry land and contain 10.5% of the world population (see McGranahan et al., 2007).
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Notes: The top panel of Figure 2 plots normalized Gaussian curves that fit damage functions for agri-
culture (gray solid line) and non-agriculture (black dashed line) as a function of temperature (in Celsius
degrees). In the bottom panels, latitude (geographic coordinate) is measured on the Y-axis, and sector-
specific productivity changes between 2010 and 2100 are measured on the X-axis (as % of deviation from
the 2010 level). The size of country labels is proportional to the logarithm of population aged 25 to 64
in 2010, while the darkness of country labels is inversely proportional to GDP per capita in 2010. Solid
gray (dashed black) lines represent fitted quadratic trends for Intermediate (Maximalist) scenarios.
Figure 2: Damage Functions and Long-term Productivity Changes (2010-2100)
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between temperature and non-agricultural productivity, after smoothing Gn(T ) using a
Gaussian function and normalizing the maximal productivity level at unity. For each
country and period t, we plug in the monthly levels of temperature, Tm,t, in Ga(.) and
Gn(.), thereby accounting for the anticipated variability in temperature within a given
year. We then compute the averages of these TFP levels for each period t:
Gr,t =
1
12
12∑
m=1
Gr(Tm,t).
Recall from the right panel of Figure 1 that expected variations in temperature are
weakly correlated with latitude. On the contrary, the current level of temperature is
highly correlated with latitude (left panel of Figure 1): countries above the 35th parallel
have average temperature levels under 20◦ Celsius, while countries at lower latitude have
a higher average temperature. Hence, the same variation in temperature will induce
dramatically different effects on productivity. The bottom-left panel of Figure 2 depicts
the predicted percentage variation in agricultural productivity by latitude caused by the
change in temperature between 2010 and 2100. On average, in the Intermediate scenario
(gray solid line), agricultural productivity decreases by 20% to 25% in countries close to
the equator and increases by the same amount at high latitudes. The bottom right panel
in Figure 2 shows the corresponding damage function in the non-agricultural sector. On
average, non-agricultural productivity decreases by 10% to 15% in countries close to the
equator, and increases slightly at high latitude levels.16 The bottom panel of Figure 2
also gives the predicted percentage variation in productivity implied by the Maximalist
with respect to the Minimalist (the black dashed lines). In both sectors, the productivity
responses are roughly twice as large as those induced by the Intermediate scenario.
SLR and forced displacements. To proxy the number of people affected by SLR, we
need to determine the fraction of the population living in low-elevation coastal areas. We
use the NASA database on the distribution of the population by elevation, by country, and
by region type (urban versus rural).17 In OECD countries, we assume that sea walls or
other solutions will be constructed to protect vulnerable populations from rising sea levels.
On the contrary, SLR will induce forced displacements in non-OECD countries. For each
non-OECD country, we produce region-specific estimates of the fraction of population
living at an elevation under 1.1m or under 1.3m using a third order polynomial of the
NASA data. Figure 3 focuses only on those countries in which the share of population
16Both graphs include the 3-order polynomial trend, which gives an R-squared of 0.33 for the agricul-
tural sector and 0.41 for the non-agricultural sector.
17We assume rural regions are totally specialized in agriculture and urban regions only produce non-
agricultural goods.
14
living in low-lying areas exceeds 4%. Bars represent the percentage of the population by
country living in low-lying areas in 2010.18 This includes about 60 million people aged
25 to 64 who were living at an elevation under 1.1m. NASA predicts this number will
approach 80 million by 2040. In a few countries, the percentage of population living at
an elevation below 1.1m is larger than 10%, with the largest share in the Maldives.
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Notes: Dark (light) gray bars depict the share of population living below 1.1 (1.3) meters in non-OECD
countries. Own calculations based on NASA data.
Figure 3: Forced Displacements due to SLR in non-OECD Countries
Overall, Figure 3 shows that the most affected countries are not necessarily the poorest
ones. SLR mostly affects countries with a large share of population located along the
coasts of all seas and oceans or in the major river deltas and estuaries. The relative
exposure of some South and East Asian and West African countries is also significant.
Some Pacific islands situated a few centimeters above sea level are extremely vulnerable.
Clearly, both rich and poor countries are going to be adversely affected by the SLR. It
would certainly be an exaggeration to assume that roughly 80 million flooded individuals
will all migrate internationally in the near future. Some of them will certainly move to
another region or country, but others will relocate within the same region or invest in
building sea defences (in OECD countries). Our micro-founded model endogenizes forced
displacements due to SLR in non-OECD countries only.
18Although the 2010 shares differ from the long-run (endogenous) population shares which will be
impacted during the 21st century (i.e., in 2040, 2070 and 2100), they give an indication of the scale of
forced displacements induced by SLR.
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Effects of fast-onset climate shocks. While CLC usually refers to long-term changes
in mean temperature and sea level, climatologists also predict changes in the frequency of
extreme weather shocks (droughts, floods, storms, heat waves, etc.). To account for these
fast-onset shocks, we consider more pessimistic scenarios in which natural disasters and
high temperatures induce additional income losses that can hardly be avoided through
long-term adaptation strategies. The extensive and intensive margins (i.e., frequency
and intensity) of these fast-onset weather shocks are highly uncertain. However, their
frequencies are likely to be correlated with higher moments of the regional temperature
distribution, including the weights of upper tails of these distributions, which are expected
to deviate significantly in the future. Figure 4 compares the mean distribution of average
daily temperatures of the world in 2010 and 2100; we compute it as the population-
weighted average of country-specific distributions. It shows that changes in the mean
surface temperature (represented by the vertical dashed lines) will be accompanied by a
net increase in the fraction of days with temperatures above 20◦ or 30◦ Celsius (light and
dark gray surfaces, respectively). These extreme temperature events tend to be important
sources of economic costs at the local scale.
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Notes: Figure 4 depicts the population-weighted global distribution of temperatures in 2010 (gray line)
and in 2100 (black line) assuming the Intermediate temperature scenario. The dashed vertical lines
represent global average temperatures.
Figure 4: Annual Distribution of World Temperatures in 2010 and 2100
We consider three additional sources of climate-driven costs and model them as a de-
crease in disposable income (which is equivalent to a tax on income). Firstly, we assume
that weather-related natural disasters (i.e., floods, storms/hurricanes, and droughts) in-
duce direct income losses. Using the EM-DAT database, which collects information on
human and material losses generated by disasters over the last six decades, we regress
the average shares of GDP lost due to extreme weather events on the annual mean level
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of temperature, controlling for a time trend. We use this estimation to predict future
losses as a function of temperature forecasts. Secondly, we assume that heat waves induce
a direct income loss due to increased health issues and medical expenditures. Using the
data on monthly minimal, mean, and maximal temperatures in all countries, we construct
three-parameter distributions of temperature by month and by country, and compute the
frequency of heat waves with temperature above 30◦ Celsius (represented by the dark gray
area in Figure 4). Using data from the US, we quantify the cost of heat waves as a share
of national income, and predict the income losses in all countries. Thirdly, we assume
that high levels of temperature translate into TFP losses due to lower labor efficiency.
With a three-parameter distribution of temperatures, we compute the shares of working
days that have a temperature above 20◦ Celsius (the net light gray area on Figure 4). We
link labor productivity to high temperature levels using the coefficients estimated by Dell
et al. (2014).
CLC and conflicts. In contexts of high political and social instability, CLC can also
contribute to the onset and propagation of (violent) conflicts driven by the deterioration
of governance capacities and the increase in inequality among groups (Gleditsch, 2012;
Miguel et al., 2004). The relationship between CLC and conflict has been investigated in
a number of studies, which have produced mixed results (Cattaneo et al., 2019). Using
a hierarchical meta-analysis of 55 studies, Burke et al. (2015b) find that deviations from
moderate temperatures and precipitation patterns systematically increase conflict risk
(including interpersonal conflict, such as assault and murder, and intergroup conflict,
such as riots and civil war). On average, one standard-deviation rise in temperature
increases interpersonal conflict by 2.4% and intergroup conflict by 11.3%. In turn, these
conflicts lead to forced displacement.
Abel et al. (2019) examine the link between climate, conflict, and forced migration from
2006 to 2015. They find that climate shocks affect the likelihood of armed conflict and
the outflows of asylum seekers. The effect of climate on conflict occurrence is particularly
relevant for countries undergoing political transformation (i.e., Western Asia after the
Arab Spring) or poverty crisis (i.e., war episodes in sub-Saharan Africa). Subject to a
conflict, their point estimates suggest that existence of conflict increases the outflows of
asylum seekers by 100 to 150%. Similar findings were reported in Dao et al. (2018), who
show that severe armed conflicts increase the dyadic stock of migrants twofold in the
long-term.19
In our simulations, we model conflicts as changes in amenity differentials between
origin and destination countries. We assume that conflicts decrease net international mi-
19It increases the dyadic stock of migrants by a factor of four in the medium-term.
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gration costs in seven Western Asian countries (Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, West Bank,
Syria, and Iran) and in ten countries with high levels of poverty (Burundi, Cameroon,
Eritrea, Guinea, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, East Timor, Togo, and Zimbabwe). In
these 17 countries, the decrease in net emigration costs is such that their emigration stocks
would increase twofold at current wage rates, as explained in Appendix C. This shock is
identical across skill groups and regions.
3 Behavioral and Market Responses
We now explain how the damage functions defined in Section 2 translate into behavioral
and price responses. To do so, we construct an overlapping generations model of the
world economy that represents a set of countries and regions populated by agents, who
live for two periods (childhood and adulthood). One period stands for the active life of
one generation (30 years); we ignore the retirement period for simplicity.
Our framework is similar to Delogu et al. (2018) and Burzyn´ski et al. (2019) but relies
on different technological assumptions and accounts for more sources of heterogeneity
between people. Our priority is to capture the high degree of heterogeneity in exposure
to CLC and in migratory behavior across individuals. Given that education is a key
determinant of migration decisions, we distinguish between two types of adults in each
period, with s ∈ {h, l} denoting college-educated workers (h) and the less educated (l).
In addition, we distinguish two sectors/regions with heterogeneous productivity, with
r ∈ {a, n} denoting agriculture (a) and non-agriculture (n) in each country. Each region
consists of two areas of time-varying size, with b ∈ {f, d} denoting the flooded area (f) and
the non-flooded/dry area (d). The model endogenizes the levels of productivity in both
sectors/regions as a function of both the temperature and the average level of schooling
of the resident workers. There is no economic activity and no one can live in the flooded
area.
Adults are the only decision makers. They maximize their utility and decide where to
live, how much to consume, and how much to invest in the quantity and quality of their
children. As far as the location decision is concerned, each new adult decides whether
to stay in the region where she grew up (if the area of birth does not get flooded), to
move locally within the same region (if the area of birth gets flooded), to emigrate to
the other region within the same country, or to emigrate abroad. This choice depends on
economic disparities across regions and countries, on moving costs, and on the area type.
Fertility and education decisions are governed by a warm-glow motive. Adults directly
value the quality and quantity of children. It follows that the dynamic structure of the
model is totally recursive. In this section, we describe our technological and preference
18
assumptions, derive the profit and utility maximization conditions, and define the world-
economy intertemporal equilibrium. We also summarize our parameterization strategy.
3.1 Technology
Production is feasible only in the non-flooded area of each region r. We assume that
output is proportional to labor in efficiency units.20 Each country is characterized by a
pair of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions with two types of
workers (as in Burzyn´ski et al., 2019; Gollin et al., 2014; Vollrath, 2009). For simplicity,
we assume that firms in both sectors produce the same good. Hence, contrary to DRH
or Shayegh (2017), we disregard variations in the relative price of the agricultural good,
and we normalize the price of the single good to unity. In theory, change in relative price
can mitigate or reinforce the impact of CLC. DRH show that CLC has uncertain effects
on the relative price because it induces a rise in agricultural productivity in the North
and a decline in the South.21 In addition, Burzyn´ski et al. (2019) show that responses
to productivity and migration policy reforms are quantitatively similar when considering
that agricultural and non-agricultural goods are identical or imperfect substitutes as in
Boppart (2014). Compared to Burzyn´ski et al. (2019), our model formalizes the link
between CLC and the productivity gap between regions.
The output level in region r at time t is given by:
Yr,t = Ar,t
(
ηr,t
1 + ηr,t
`
σr−1
σr
r,h,t +
1
1 + ηr,t
`
σr−1
σr
r,l,t
) σr
σr−1 ∀t, r, (1)
where Ar,t denotes the productivity scale factor in sector r at time t (referred to as TFP
henceforth), ηr,t is a sector-specific variable governing the relative productivity of college-
educated workers at time t (i.e., a skill bias in productivity), and σr is the sector-specific
elasticity of substitution between the two types of worker. The number of adult workers
of type s employed in region r at time t is denoted by `r,s,t, which differs from the total
20Such a model without physical capital features a globalized economy with a common international
interest rate. Assuming a first-stage, Cobb-Douglas production function with physical capital (K) and
composite labor (Q), Yr = Âr(Kr/Qr)
αQr, and assuming that capital is internationally mobile with
an exogenous international price of capital (R), (Kr/Qr)
1−α = (αÂr/R) would give Yr = ArQr where
Ar = Â
1/(1−α)
r (αÂr/R)
α/(1−α) is a modified TFP level. This hypothesis is in line with Kennan (2013)
or Klein and Ventura (2009) who assume that capital ”chases” labor in efficiency units in the long-term.
Our model abstracts from potential (endogenous) variations in the international price of capital and their
impacts on income inequality.
21When we consider heterogeneous goods in a small open economy context, variations in the relative
price of the agricultural good can mitigate or reinforce the urbanization process. It is mitigated if CLC
decreases the share of agriculture in the world’s total output (i.e., if the output loss in low-latitude
countries exceeds the output gain in the North). In the benchmark scenario of DRH (Figure 4), changes
in relative price are small. If the relative price of agricultural goods increases, the migration responsiveness
predicted by our model can be considered an upper bound.
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population, Lr,s,t (as explained below).
Wage rates are determined by the marginal productivity of labor and there is no
involuntary unemployment. This yields:
wr,h,t = A
1
σr−1
r,t
(
ηr,t
1+ηr,t
`
σr−1
σr
r,h,t +
1
1+ηr,t
`
σr−1
σr
r,l,t
) 1
σr−1
ηr,t
1+ηr,t
`
−1
σr
r,h,t
wr,l,t = A
1
σr−1
r,t
(
ηr,t
1+ηr,t
`
σr−1
σr
r,h,t +
1
1+ηr,t
`
σr−1
σr
r,l,t
) 1
σr−1
1
1+ηr,t
`
−1
σr
r,l,t
∀t, r. (2)
It follows that the wage ratio between high-skilled and low-skilled workers in region r
at time t is given by:
$r,t ≡ wr,h,t
wr,l,t
= ηr,tz
−1
σr
r,t ∀t, r, (3)
where zr,t ≡ `r,h,t/`r,l,t is the skill ratio in employment in region r at time t.
In this setting, CLC affects production and income differentials through two channels.
Firstly, in line with Section 2.2, variations in temperature influence TFP in agriculture
and in the non-agriculture sector. Secondly, CLC affects fertility, education, and mobility
decisions, which in turn impact both the skill ratio in the labor force and technology. To
account for these effects, damage functions and two types of technological externalities
are factored in. For TFP, we assume that the aggregate TFP level in each sector depends
on the temperature level and the average level of workers’ education. We have:
Ar,t = γ
tArG(Tr,t)F (zr,t) ∀t, r, (4)
where γt is a time trend in productivity which is common to all countries (γ > 1), Ar is the
exogenous component of TFP in region r (reflecting specific local factors such as the pro-
portion of arable land, soil fertility, land ruggedness, etc.), G(Tr,t) is the inverted-U-shaped
function of temperature (Tr,t) described in Section 2.2, while F (zr,t) is a simple Lucas-
type aggregate externality (see Lucas, 1988) capturing the fact that college-educated
workers facilitate innovation and/or the adoption of advanced technologies. We assume
F (zr,t) = z
r
r,t is a concave function of the skill ratio in employment, where r ∈ (0, 1) is
the sector-specific elasticity of TFP to the skill ratio in sector r.
As far as the skill bias is concerned, we assume directed technical change that affects
different types of workers non-uniformly. As technology improves, the relative produc-
tivity of college-educated workers increases, particularly in the non-agricultural sector
(Acemoglu, 2002; Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013). For example, Autor et al. (2003)
show that computerization is associated with declining relative industry demand for rou-
tine manual and cognitive tasks, and increased relative demand for non-routine cognitive
tasks. The observed relative demand shift favors college-educated versus non-college-
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educated labor. We write:
ηr,t = ηrz
κr
r,t ∀t, r, (5)
where ηr is an exogenous term and κr ∈ (0, 1) is the sector-specific elasticity of the skill
bias to the skill ratio in sector r.
3.2 Preferences
The number of new native adults of type s at time t is denoted by Nr,s,t. Depending on
the elevation structure of the region and on the sea level rise, part of the region may be
flooded at the beginning of the period. If so, a fraction Θr,t of the native population is
forced to leave. We label the number of forcibly displaced people as N fr,s,t = Θr,tNr,s,t, and
the rest of the native population as Ndr,s,t = (1 − Θr,t)Nr,s,t. Only the latter may decide
not to move. New adults make consumption, fertility, education and migration decisions
in early adult life. As illustrated in Figure 5, those who grew up in the non-flooded area
of the region have the choice between staying in the region (at no cost), emigrating to
another region r′ within the same country (at a cost xrr′), or emigrating to an OECD
country (at a cost xrF ). Individuals who grew up in the flooded area have the possibility
of relocating within the same region (from flooded to non-flooded area). They lose their
residential capital and incur a welfare loss that corresponds to a fraction xrr of their
lifetime utility. They can also emigrate to another region or to another country at the
same cost as those who grew up in the non-flooded area.
Figure 5: Migration Options and Associated Costs
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3.2.1 Individuals Raised in Non-flooded Areas
We first focus on people who grew up in the non-flooded area (d) of their region of
birth. Individual decisions to emigrate result from the comparison of discrete alternatives:
staying in the region of birth, emigrating to either another region or a foreign country.
To model these decisions, we use a logarithmic outer utility function with a deterministic
and a random component. The utility of an adult of type s, born in the non-flooded part
of region of origin r◦, moving to the non-flooded part of region/country r is given by:
Udr◦r,s,t = ln v
d
r,s,t + ln(1− xdr◦r,s,t) + ξdr◦r,s,t ∀s, t, r◦, r (6)
where vdr,s,t ∈ R is the deterministic level of utility that can be reached in the location
r at period t (governed by the inner utility function described below) and xdr◦r,s,t ≤ 1
captures the effort required to migrate from region r◦ to location r (such that xdr◦r◦,s,t =
0). Migration costs are exogenous; they vary across location pairs and education levels.
The individual-specific random taste shock for moving from region r◦ to r is denoted by
ξdr◦r,s,t ∈ R and follows an iid Type I Extreme Value distribution with a common scale
parameter µ > 0. This scale parameter governs the responsiveness of migration decisions
to changes in vdr,s,t and xr◦r,s,t. Although ξ
d
r◦r,s,t is individual-specific, we omit individual
subscripts for notational convenience.
In line with Galor and Weil (2000), Galor (2011), De La Croix and Doepke (2003,
2004), or Delogu et al. (2018), the inner utility ln vdr,s,t is a function of consumption
(cdr,s,t), fertility (n
d
r,s,t), and the probability that each child becomes highly skilled (p
d
r,s,t):
ln vdr,s,t = ln c
d
r,s,t + θ ln
(
ndr,s,tp
d
r,s,t
) ∀s, t, r, (7)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is a preference parameter for the quantity and quality of children.
The probability that a child becomes highly skilled increases with the share of time
that is spent in education (qdr,s,t):
pdr,s,t =
(
pir + q
d
r,s,t
)λ ∀s, t, r, (8)
where pir is an exogenous parameter that is region-specific and λ governs the elasticity of
knowledge acquisition to education investment.
A type-s adult in region r receives a wage rate wr,s,t per unit of time worked. Raising
a child requires a time cost φ (thereby reducing the labor market participation rate) and
each unit of time spent by a child in education incurs a cost equal to Er,t. The budget
constraint writes as:
cdr,s,t = wr,s,t(1− φndr,s,t)− ndr,s,tqdr,s,tEr,t. (9)
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It follows that the labor supply of each type-s adult in region r at time t is given by:
`dr,s,t = 1− φndr,s,t. (10)
In the following sub-sections, we solve the optimization problem backwards. We first
derive the optimal fertility rate and investment in education in a given location r by
individuals of type s at time t, which determines the optimal level of utility, v∗r,s,t. We
then characterize the choice of the optimal location.
Education and fertility. Each adult in region r maximizes her utility (7) subject to
(8) and (9). Solving the system of two first-order conditions and the budget constraints
yields the following interior solution:
q∗r,s,t =
λφwr,s,t−pirEr,t
(1−λ)Er,t ≡ q(wr,s,t, Er,t, pir)
n∗r,s,t =
θ(1−λ)
1+θ
· wr,s,t
φwr,s,t−pirEr,t ≡ n(wr,s,t, Er,t, pir)
c∗r,s,t = wr,s,t(1− φn∗r,s,t)− n∗r,s,tq∗r,s,tEr,t ≡ c(wr,s,t, Er,t, pir)
∀s, t, r. (11)
The deterministic indirect utility function can be obtained by substituting the first-
order conditions into (7). This yields:
ln v∗r,s,t = ln c
∗
r,s,t + θ ln
(
n∗r,s,t
)
+ θλ ln
(
pir + q
∗
r,s,t
)
. (12)
Migration. Given their taste characteristics (captured by ξ), each individual chooses
the location that maximizes her utility, defined in Equation (6). Under the Type I Ex-
treme Value distribution of ξ with a scale parameter µ, McFadden (1974) shows that
the probability of choosing region r originating from region r◦ is governed by a logit
expression. Therefore, the emigration rate is given by:
Mdr◦r,s,t
Ndr◦,s,t
=
exp
(
ln
(
v∗r,s,t(1− xdr◦r,s,t)
)1/µ)
∑
k exp
(
ln
(
v∗k,s,t(1− xdr◦k,s,t)
)1/µ) = (v∗r,s,t)1/µ(1− xdr◦r,s,t)1/µ∑
k(v
∗
k,s,t)
1/µ(1− xdr◦k,s,t)1/µ
.
Skill-specific emigration rates are endogenous and fall between 0 and 1. Individuals
who grew up in region n (resp. a) choose between staying in their region of origin n
(resp. a), moving to the other region a (resp. n), or emigrating to a foreign country
F . The emigration rates from r◦ to a particular destination r depend on the utility
levels attainable in all regions k of the world. The choices of emigrating internally or
internationally are thus interdependent.
Staying rates (Mdr◦r◦,s,t/N
d
r◦,s,t) are governed by the same logit model. It follows that
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the emigrant-to-stayer ratio (mr◦r,s,t) is governed by the following expression:
mdr◦r,s,t ≡
Mdr◦r,s,t
Mdr◦r◦,s,t
=
(
v∗r,s,t
v∗r◦,s,t
)1/µ
(1− xdr◦r,s,t)1/µ. (13)
Equation (13) is a gravity-like migration equation, which states that the ratio of
emigrants from region r◦ to location r to stayers in region r◦ (i.e., individuals born in
r◦ who remain in r◦) is an increasing function of the utility in the destination location
r and a decreasing function of the utility in r◦. The proportion of migrants from r◦ to
r also decreases with the bilateral migration cost xr◦r,s,t. Labor is not perfectly mobile
across sectors/regions; internal migration costs (xan,s,t and xna,s,t) capture all private costs
that migrants must incur to move between regions. In line with Young (2013), internal
mobility is driven by self-selection (i.e., skill-specific disparities in utility across regions
as well as heterogeneity in individual unobserved characteristics). Similarly, international
migration costs (xaF,s,t and xnF,s,t) capture private costs and the legal/visa costs imposed
by the destination countries. They are also assumed to be exogenous. Heterogeneity in
migration tastes implies that emigrants select all destinations for which xr◦r,s,t < 1 (if
xr◦r,s,t=1, the corridor is empty).
3.2.2 Forcibly Displaced People
Individuals raised in the flooded area of region r◦ (denoted by the superscript f) are
forced to move. If they relocate into the non-flooded area of their region of birth r◦, they
face a local relocation cost equivalent to xfr◦r◦,s,t > 0. If they move to another country
or region, they face the same moving costs as individuals born in the non-flooded area
(i.e., xfr◦r,s,t = x
d
r◦r,s,t ∀r 6= r◦). The local relocation cost is modeled as an effort to move
within one’s region of birth; consequently it does not affect workers’ budget constraints
or their optimal consumption, fertility, and education decisions. Hence, from Equations
(11) and (12) we have qfr,s,t = q
d
r,s,t = q
∗
r,s,t, n
f
r,s,t = n
d
r,s,t = n
∗
r,s,t, c
f
r,s,t = c
d
r,s,t = c
∗
r,s,t and
vfr,s,t = v
d
r,s,t = v
∗
r,s,t. However, the local relocation cost influences decisions to emigrate
to another region or country. The emigrant-to-stayer ratio (mfr∗r,s,t) for forcibly displaced
people is governed by:
mfr◦r,s,t ≡
M fr◦r,s,t
M fr◦r◦,s,t
=
(
v∗r,s,t
v∗r◦,s,t
)1/µ( 1− xfr◦r,s,t
1− xfr◦r◦,s,t
)1/µ
Since xfr◦r◦,s,t > 0, m
f
r◦r,s,t > m
d
r◦r,s,t, forcibly displaced people tend to migrate more than
those who grew up in non-flooded regions.
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3.3 Dynamics and Inter-temporal Equilibrium
We can characterize the equilibrium structure of the resident population in the non-flooded
area of the region ∀s, t, r:22
Ln,s,t =
Ndn,s,t
1+mdna,s,t+m
d
nF,s,t
+
Nfn,s,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nF,s,t
+
man,s,tNda,s,t
1+mdan,s,t+m
d
aF,s,t
+
mfan,s,tN
f
a,s,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
aF,s,t
La,s,t =
Nda,s,t
1+mdan,s,t+m
d
aF,s,t
+
Nfa,s,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
aF,s,t
+
mna,s,tNdn,s,t
1+mdna,s,t+m
d
nF,s,t
+
mfna,s,tN
f
n,s,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nF,s,t
. (14)
The total labor supply is given by:
`n,s,t =
Ndn,s,t`
d
n,s,t
1+mdna,s,t+m
d
nF,s,t
+
Nfn,s,t`
f
n,s,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nF,s,t
+
man,s,tNda,s,t`
d
n,s,t
1+mdan,s,t+m
d
aF,s,t
+
mfan,s,tN
f
a,s,t`
d
n,s,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
aF,s,t
`a,s,t =
Nda,s,t`
d
a,s,t
1+mdan,s,t+m
d
aF,s,t
+
Nfa,s,t`
f
a,s,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
aF,s,t
+
mna,s,tNdn,s,t`
d
a,s,t
1+mdna,s,t+m
d
nF,s,t
+
mfna,s,tN
f
n,s,t`
d
a,s,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nF,s,t
. (15)
Together with the number and the structure of the resident population at time t,
fertility and education decisions (nbr,s,t, q
b
r,s,t ∀r, b, s) determine the size and structure of
the native population before migration (Nr,s,t+1 ∀r, s) at time t+ 1. For all t, r, we have:
Nn,h,t+1 =∑
s
[
Ndn,s,tn
d
n,s,tp
d
n,h,t
1+mdna,s,t+m
d
nF,s,t
+
Nfn,s,tn
f
n,s,tp
f
n,h,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nF,s,t
+
man,s,tNda,s,tn
d
n,s,tp
d
n,h,t
1+mdan,s,t+m
d
aF,s,t
+
mfan,s,tN
f
a,s,tn
d
n,s,tp
d
n,h,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
aF,s,t
]
Na,h,t+1 =∑
s
[
Nda,s,tn
d
a,s,tp
d
a,h,t
1+mdan,s,t+m
d
aF,s,t
+
Nfa,s,tn
f
a,s,tp
f
a,h,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
aF,s,t
+
mna,s,tNdn,s,tn
d
a,s,tp
d
a,h,t
1+mdna,s,t+m
d
nF,s,t
+
mfna,s,tN
f
n,s,tn
d
a,s,tp
d
a,h,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nF,s,t
]
(16)
Similar expressions characterize the evolution of the low-skilled population, except
that pbr,s,t must be replaced by (1− pbr,s,t) on the numerator of each term.
Finally, the cost of education is assumed to be proportional to the high-skilled wage
in the region, multiplied by a fixed, region-specific factor ψr,t (capturing education pol-
icy/quality, population density, average distance to schools, etc.):
Er,t = ψr,twr,h,t ∀r, s. (17)
An inter-temporal equilibrium for the world economy can be defined as following:
Definition 1 For a set {γ, θ, λ, φ, µ} of common parameters, a set {σr, r, κr} of sector-
specific elasticities, a set
{
Ar,t,Γ
η
r,t, xr◦r,s,t, ψr, pir
}
of country- and region-specific exoge-
nous characteristics, and a set {Nr,s,0} of predetermined variables, an intertemporal equi-
22In the OECD member states, these variables should be supplemented by the the inflow of immigrants,
Ir,s,t. For simplicity, we assume that the distribution of immigrants by destination is time-invariant,
calibrated on 2010. Equation (13) also determines the outflow of international migrants by education
level.
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librium is a set {Ar,t, ηr,h,t, wr,s,t, nr,s,t, qr,s,t, vr,s,t, Er,t,mr◦r,s,t, Nr,s,t+1, Lr,s,t, `r,s,t} of en-
dogenous variables, which simultaneously satisfies technological constraints (4), (5), and
(17), profit maximization conditions (2), utility maximization conditions (11), (12) and
(13) in all countries and regions of the world, and such that the equilibrium structure and
dynamics of population satisfy (14), (15) and (16).
The equilibrium level of the other variables described above (in particular, Γ`r,t, Γ
η
r,t,
Γwr,t, as well as urbanization rates and international migration outflows and inflows) can
be computed as a by-product of the reduced set of endogenous variables. Note that
equilibrium wage rates are obtained by substituting the labor force variables into the
wage equation (2), thereby assuming full employment. By the Walras law, the market for
goods is cleared.
3.4 Parameterization
We summarize our parameterization strategy for 145 developing countries and for the
entire set of 34 OECD countries.23 More details can be found in the Appendix (Section
A). In particular, Table A.1 summarizes the calibration outcomes. Our strategy is such
that our intermediate CLC scenario matches socio-demographic and economic data for
1980 and 2010, as well as reasonable socio-demographic prospects for 2040.
Economic data sources. We collect data on socio-demographic and economic char-
acteristics of 179 countries in 1980 and 2010. We use data on Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the agriculture
share in value added from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAOSTAT).
As for the structure of the resident labor force by education level and by sector, we use
the estimates described in Burzyn´ski et al. (2019). Data on wages by education level are
obtained from Biavaschi et al. (2019) for the non-agricultural sector and from the Gallup
World Polls for the agricultural sector. We model international migration to OECD coun-
tries only. From the Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD countries (DIOC),
we extract the number of emigrants by education level for 2010. Within each country, we
split the number of emigrants to OECD by region of origin and education level, assum-
ing that the structure of migration aspirations (obtained from the Gallup World Polls)
is identical to the structure of actual emigration stocks. To proxy the average fertility
rate, we divide the total native population of adults in 2010 by the resident population of
adults in 1980, both taken from the UN Population Division. We use the Gallup World
23With the exceptions of Macao, North-Korea, Somalia, and Taiwan, all countries that are not covered
by our sample have less than 100,000 inhabitants.
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Polls and extract the average number of children per household in urban and rural regions
by skill level for 2010.
Technological parameters. For each region, we collect the data on cross-country in-
come gaps between college graduates and the less educated. We calibrate the elasticity
of substitution between college graduates and less educated workers, relying on existing
studies: For the non-agricultural sector we follow Ottaviano and Peri (2012), who suggest
setting the elasticity close to 2, whereas for the agricultural sector, it is usually assumed
that the substitution is perfect (e.g. Lucas, 2009; Vollrath, 2009). We then calibrate the
skill-bias term, ηr,t, so as to match the observed income ratio between skill groups. Magni-
tudes of technological externalities are calibrated using constructed data on labor supply,
region-specific incomes, and wage gaps.
Preference parameters. The literature indicates some common values of several pref-
erence parameters. We assign the following values to the parameters that are time-
invariant and equal for all countries: θ = 0.25, λ = 0.5, φ = 0.14, µ = 1.4.24
The education cost parameters pir and ψr,t affect people’s fertility and education deci-
sions. We calibrate them to match the population dynamics between 1980 and 2010, i.e.,
the transition from the resident population in 1980 and the native population in 2010.
We obtain international and internal migration costs from Equation (13). For the latter,
we assume positive migration from rural to urban regions (i.e., xan,s,t < 1 and xna,s,t = 1).
Using a similar parameterization strategy, Burzyn´ski et al. (2019) predict variations in the
dyadic stocks of migrants between 1950 and 1980 and obtain a close fit to the observed
values.
Projection parameters. Our set of parameters enables the model to match the geo-
graphic disparities in income, population, and human capital in 2010 and their evolution
between 1980 and 2010. The philosophy of our baseline projection exercise is to predict
future trends in income, population, and human capital if all parameters remain constant,
with the exception of the parameters governing access to education. More precisely, we
constrain our baseline trajectory to be compatible with medium-term official demographic
projections, as reflected by the UN projections of the national adult population and the
proportion of college graduates for 2040. Within the model, we allow the region-specific
cost of education, ψr,t to change between 2010 and 2040. We calibrate its variations so
24Given the expression in (9), this assumption reflects setting the bound of the maximal number of
children equal to 7 (i.e., 14 children per couple). See Docquier et al. (2017) for a brief review of studies
using similar parameter values. Consult Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013), who find a value
between 0.6 and 0.7 for the migration elasticity 1/µ.
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as to minimize the sum of squared differences in population and human capital stock
between our baseline simulations and the UN projections for 2040. Using our two data
points, we empirically identify a process of quadratic convergence in ψr,t. For subse-
quent years, our baseline scenario assumes a continuation of this convergence process, in
line with the new Sustainable Development Agenda of the United Nations. Under this
assumption, Burzyn´ski et al. (2019) show that the model simulations fit the official socio-
demographic projections very well. The success of such a stylized model in generating
realistic projections of population, human capital, and urbanization proves our concept
of modeling.
4 Results
In Section 4.1, we focus on slow-onset mechanisms (i.e., changes in productivity due to
rising temperature and forced displacements due to SLR) and analyze their economic,
demographic, and mobility implications. Then, Section 4.2 starts from the Intermediate
scenario and supplements it with fast-onset mechanisms and conflicts over resources.
4.1 Slow-onset Mechanisms
We first consider the three scenarios (Intermediate, Minimalist, and Maximalist) defined
in Section 2.1 and discuss the worldwide effects of CLC on income per capita, income
inequality, the size and structure of population, human capital, urbanization, and inter-
national migration. Then, we highlight the cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of
CLC before quantifying internal and international migration responses.
Aggregate effects. The average effects on the world economy and by region are de-
picted in Table 1. The bottom lines of this table give the worldwide responses, computed
as the weighted averages of the positive and negative effects observed in high-income and
developing countries. The values in bold characters are the projections obtained in the
Minimalist scenario, maintaining constant temperature and sea levels. The values below
are the variations induced by the Intermediate and Maximalist scenarios, expressed as
percentages of deviation from the Minimalist scenario (for GDP and population) or as
percentage points of variation (for the share of college graduates, the urban share, or the
international emigration rate).
In the Intermediate scenario, we find that CLC increases the worldwide levels of income
as well as income per worker, but makes the world distribution of income less equal. World
GDP increases by 2.8% in 2100 and population decreases by 0.4%. However, total GDP
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and GDP per worker decrease in non-OECD regions. The largest losses are observed in
sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, where income per worker decreases by 10.3% and
7.9%, respectively. East Asian countries and Pacific islands also incur severe losses. The
effects are roughly twice as large in the Maximalist scenario.
These results are due to multiple factors. Firstly, higher temperature levels induce
positive changes in TFP at high levels of latitude (where income per worker is initially
higher) and negative changes in TFP close to the equator (where income per worker is
initially lower). Secondly, in developing countries, CLC reallocates people from lower-
productivity rural regions to higher-productivity urban regions. Thirdly, CLC reallocates
people from poorer countries to richer countries.
Given existing disparities in education access, urbanization and international migra-
tion tend to reduce population growth and stimulate human capital acquisition. This
suggests that CLC could have a detrimental impact on the welfare of the first genera-
tion affected, while enhancing future living standards.25 However, our simulations do not
support such an intergenerational trade-off. Overall, the effects of CLC on the size of
the world population and on the share of college graduates are small. Compared to the
Minimalist scenario, the global effects are virtually nil in 2040. We identify population
movements from non-OECD to OECD countries, but predict no effect on the world pop-
ulation. By the end of the century, the world population size would only decrease by
0.4% in the Intermediate scenario and 0.9% in the Maximalist scenario. An increase in
population is observed in OECD countries only, due to increased immigration. As for the
share of college-educated workers, it increases by 0.15 percentage points in the Intermedi-
ate scenario and 0.38 percentage points in the Maximalist scenario (i.e., 1/130 and 1/50
of the Minimalist level, respectively). In most non-OECD regions, CLC reduces the level
of human capital, while brain drain offsets the positive effects of urbanization on access
to education.
In OECD countries, human capital decreases as well; new immigrants from the South
are less educated than native citizens. Hence, CLC slightly increases the worldwide av-
erage proportion of college graduates but, due to skill selection in climate migration,
the level of human capital decreases in virtually all of the world’s regions. This is be-
cause climate migrants are more educated than those left behind but less educated than
host-country natives.
25This is suggested by Young (2005) in the case of the AIDS epidemic in South Africa.
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Consistently, the effects of CLC on interregional and international mobility are lim-
ited. Compared to the Minimalist scenario, the Intermediate scenario in 2040 yields an
increase in world urbanization rate by 0.33 percentage points and an increase in the world
proportion of international migrants by 0.14 percentage points. Hence, under a constant
structure of migration costs, we estimate that interregional mobility responses exceed the
international ones by factor of 2.4. By 2100, the effects are greater: the world urban share
will have increased by 0.78 percentage points (i.e., 1/75 of the Minimalist level) and the
world proportion of international migrants will have increased by 0.21 percent (i.e., 1/15
of the Minimalist level). The mobility responses are estimated to be roughly 2.5 times
larger in the Maximalist scenario.
Country-specific effects. The country-specific effects of CLC are depicted in Figure
6. We report the relative differences in 2100 between the Intermediate and the Minimalist
scenarios with country labels. As before, the label font size is proportional to the log of
population of the country and the font darkness decreases with the level of GDP per
worker (i.e., poor countries are labeled in dark characters). The third-degree polynomial
trends in solid gray lines represent the difference between the Intermediate and Minimalist
scenarios. Conversely, the polynomial trends in dashed black lines represent the difference
between the Maximalist and Minimalist scenarios.
Focusing on the Intermediate scenario, Figure 6 shows that CLC will reduce income per
worker by 15% relative to non-CLC (i.e., relative to the Minimalist scenario) in countries
close to the equator, and will increase it by 10% at high levels of latitude. Hence, the
income gap between the richest and poorest countries will increase by 25% over the course
of the 21st century. Given the assumed timing of CLC, unreported results reveal that
most of the effect will occur in the first half of the century.
In developing countries, the negative effect on income results from four mechanisms
(in line with the aggregate effects discussed above). The first is the fall in TFP in both
sectors documented in Figure 2: at the equator, TFP decreases by 25% in agriculture
and by 15% in non-agriculture. The second effect is the rise in urbanization illustrated
in the second graph of Figure 6, which attenuates the TFP shocks because the average
level of labor productivity is greater in non-agriculture than in agriculture. The third
effect is the rise in emigration (see the third panel of Figure 6). Fourthly, urbanization
and international migration affect human capital accumulation. Although urbanization
increases access to education in poor countries, rising international emigration reduces
human capital accumulation in developing countries. The reason is that high-skilled
people face smaller migration costs, which implies that migration is skill biased. In poor
countries, college graduates migrate 20 times more than the less educated. CLC reduces
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the intensity of positive selection by only 10%, as shown in the fifth panel of Figure 6.
Hence, the positive effect of CLC on emigration rates tends to reduce the share of college
graduates in the origin country. For the sake of comparability, the effect of CLC on the
skill bias in internal migration is similar to that of long-haul migration, as illustrated
in the last panel of Figure 6. Combining these effects, the share of college graduates
decreases slightly in developing countries, as illustrated in the fourth panel of Figure 6.
The effects are more pronounced in the Maximalist scenario (the dashed black line on
Figure 6). In countries close to the equator, the impacts of CLC on income and human
capital are twice as large, while urbanization and emigration responses are 2.5 times
greater. Table B.2 in Appendix B reports the effect of CLC on the country-wide level of
income per worker for the 20 most adversely affected countries in 2100. Countries close
to the equator experience a long-run decrease in income per worker, which varies between
14% and 22% when the temperature increases by 2◦C. The most affected countries include
several African, South American, Asian, and Pacific countries.
Income distribution and extreme poverty. The income loss is even greater for the
poorest workers trapped in the poorest regions (i.e., rural regions). Extreme poverty is
usually measured as the percentage of population living with less than $1.90 per day
in PPP value. Nevertheless, in our secular context with a constant rate of productivity
growth and two skill groups only, we need to use a relative poverty line. We measure
extreme poverty as the percentage of adults below 2% of the worldwide average level of
income per worker.
Figure 7 compares the world distribution of income in 2100 across CLC scenarios. The
income level of all types of worker is expressed as percentage of the world average. The
relative poverty line is represented by the vertical gray line. Figure 7 clearly indicates
that CLC adversely impacts extreme poverty. In the Minimalist scenario, we identify
about 600 million individuals, who would be in extreme poverty by 2100 (about 12.8%
of the world population). This is greater than the level observed in 2010 because of the
differential in population growth between poor and rich countries/regions.
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margin represents the share of world population below the relative poverty line, while the intensive margin
computes the mean income of population below the poverty line (in percent, as a share of the average
income).
Figure 7: Effect of CLC on Income Distribution in 2100
Under the Intermediate and Maximalist scenarios, the numbers amount to 621 and 835
million (i.e., 13.2% and 17.9% of the world population), respectively.26 In addition, Figure
7 also shows that the intensity of extreme poverty increases. The ratio of average income
of the extreme poor to the worldwide average income decreases. On average, the index of
relative income of the poorest workers is divided by 1.5 when the temperature increases
by 2◦C (i.e., when comparing the Intermediate to the Minimalist, or when comparing
the Maximalist to the Intermediate).27 Hence, CLC influences extreme poverty at both
extensive and intensive margins.
Mobility responses. It is frequently claimed that CLC will create the largest inter-
national refugee crisis in world history. Figure 6 along with Table 2 suggest that this is
unlikely to be the case. We predict that CLC will induce large displacement of people
26If the poverty line equals 1% of the worldwide average income level, 181 million workers will live
in extreme poverty in 2100 under the Minimalist scenario (3.9% of the world population). This is in
comparison to 202 and 272 million workers (4.2% and 6.0%) under the Intermediate and Maximalist,
respectively.
27For instance, low-skilled workers in rural regions of Burundi earn around 0.65% of the global average
income in the Minimalist scenario. This ratio reaches 0.54 in the intermediate scenario and 0.42 in the
Maximalist.
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from vulnerable to more viable areas on Earth. However, provided migration laws and
policies remain constant, we show that most of them will move within their countries.
When compared to the Minimalist scenario, the rising temperature and sea levels in the
Intermediate scenario would increase the number of adult movers by 62.2 million people
in 2040, 22.0 million in 2070, and 15.7 million in 2100 (i.e., by 1.6%, 0.5%, and 0.3% of the
world adult population, respectively). Over the course of the 21st century, this amounts to
a total of 100 million adults (162 million in the Maximalist scenario). When accompanying
children are included, we anticipate a total of 200 to 300 million migrants over the century,
depending on the scenario. These estimates are remarkably close to those obtained by
Rigaud et al. (2018), though their radically different approach focuses on ecological and
socioeconomic aspects of the CLC, while we emphasize behavioral economic mechanisms.
Rigaud et al. (2018) predict that 65 to 145 million people of all ages could migrate within
their own countries by 2050 to escape the slow-onset impacts of CLC. Our model brings
two considerable advantages: we can disentangle forced and voluntary movements and
distinguish between local, rural-urban, and international mobility responses.
Table 2 indicates that forcibly displaced people account for a large share of climate
migration. In the Intermediate scenario, forced displacements due to sea level rise rep-
resent 86% of the total movements observed by 2040 and 72% of the total over the 21st
century. This also means that voluntary migration is non-negligible, which makes the
identification of climate refugees a complex task. This is even more pronounced in the
Maximalist scenario, in which the short- and long-run proportions of forced displacements
equal 70% and 51%, respectively.
Table 2 shows that far more people are migrating within their own countries than
across borders. Focusing on the Intermediate scenario, 71% of the total movements ob-
served by 2040 are local displacements within the region of birth (from flooded to non-
flooded areas), 20% are movements between regions (from agriculture to non-agriculture),
and only 9% are long-haul international movements from developing to OECD countries.
Over time and under unchanged migration policies in the OECD, local and interregional
movement decreases, while international mobility increases. Aggregating over the 21st
century, 60% of the total movements are local displacements, 18% are interregional, and
only 22% are international. However, it is worth noting that local and interregional move-
ments are cumulative: internal migrants’ children form the local population of the next
period. In contrast, international migrants’ children are considered natives of the host
country. This explains why CLC has a much greater cumulative impact on the urban
share than on the world proportion of international migrants. In line with Table 1, CLC
increases the share of international migrants by 0.2 percentage points.
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Table 2 also disentangles the climate-driven changes in the world migration stock by
region of origin. In the Intermediate scenario and in 2040, 45.2% of the new migrants
originate from East Asia and the Pacific, 22.8% come from the MENA region, 36.7% come
from Central Asia and Eastern Europe, while only 10.6% come from sub-Saharan Africa.
Over the whole century, these projected shares amount to 36.8% for East Asia and the
Pacific, 19.2% for the MENA region, 19.4% for Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and
19.7% for sub-Saharan Africa.
Figure 8 describes the spatial structure of these secular dyadic flows. Emigration from
East Asia and Pacific, as well as from the MENA is mostly local. On the contrary, a larger
fraction of sub-Saharan African and Latin American emigrants move long distances. Given
the constant dyadic structure of migration costs, these international migrants mostly
target the richest OECD countries in Western Europe and North America.
Notes: Figure 8 depicts the projected stocks of international, internal, and local migrants over the 21st
century. The thickness of the bars is proportional to the size of the flow; see the legend in bottom right
corner (in million people). The following regions are considered: East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), Central Asia and the Rest of Europe (CARE), the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
Figure 8: Spatial Structure of Climate Migration over the 21st Century
Similar but sharper results emerge in the Maximalist scenario. In 2040, 58% of the
total movements are local displacements, 28% are interregional movements, and only 14%
are long-haul international movements. Over the 21st century, 51% of the total projected
movements are local, 27% are interregional, and only 22% are international. In this case,
CLC will increase the world proportion of international migrants by 0.5 percentage points
in the long run.
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Although these climate-induced changes in international migration are non-negligible,
they are rather small compared to the global changes in international migration stocks.
The latter are mostly driven by the differential population growth between developed and
developing countries and by the rise in educational attainment (education makes people
more migratory partly because migratory policies in OECD countries are less stringent
for the highly educated). Over the 21st century and in the Intermediate scenario, the
average share of immigrants will be multiplied by a factor of 1.5 in settlement countries
(the US, Canada and Australia), and will increase twofold in Europe over the 21st cen-
tury. However, CLC explains between 1/10 and 1/20 of the total change in the world
population’s share of immigrants, depending on the scenario.
Table B.3 in the Appendix details these findings by region and country. In the Mini-
malist scenario, the mean emigration rate from the developing world increases by a factor
of 1.5 to 2 during the 21st century, due to the rise in education levels. When comparing the
Intermediate to the Minimalist scenario, CLC plays a minor role. It increases the mean
emigration rate by an additional factor of 1.05. As far as OECD countries are concerned,
their average share of immigrants increases by a factor of 1.5 to 2 under the Minimalist
scenario, due to rising emigration rates in the South and demographic imbalances. Again,
the contribution of CLC to increasing immigration is tiny.
These results are highly robust to the magnitude of SLR. In our Intermediate and
Maximalist scenarios, we assume a sea level increase of +1.1 and +1.3m, respectively.
The Groundwell report of Rigaud et al. (2018) assumes that SLR reaches 2m in 2040. In
unreported simulations, we keep the global increase in temperature of +2.09◦ Celsius and
consider more extreme SLR hypotheses. In line with Rigaud et al. (2018), our greater SLR
variant assumes that SLR reaches 2m in 2040. For subsequent periods, we assume the
same relative changes as in the Intermediate scenario; this yields 2.4m in 2070 and 2.7m
in 2100. Our smaller variant assumes no SLR. Compared to the Intermediate scenario,
the consideration of extreme SLR variants has a limited impact on worldwide internal
and international migration responses. This means that variations in SLR mostly induce
local displacements from flooded to non-flooded areas. Hence, the impact of slow-onset
CLC variables on international migration is overwhelmingly governed by the temperature-
related changes in productivity.
4.2 Fast-onset Mechanisms and Conflicts
In this section, we start from the Intermediate scenario and enrich it with additional mech-
anisms related to fast-onset weather shocks and conflicts over resources. The Fast-onset
scenario accounts for the correlation between changes in temperature and the frequency of
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natural disasters, as well as the negative effect of heat waves on health and labor produc-
tivity. In addition, the Conflict scenario assumes generalized conflicts in seven Western
Asian countries and ten countries with the highest exposition to poverty.
Table D.1 in Appendix D summarizes the aggregate effect on the world economy
and by region. Remember our Intermediate scenario per se predicts a 2.4% long-run
rise in the worldwide average level of income per worker compared with the Minimalist
one. In the Fast-onset scenario, CLC induces a 3.2% decrease in disposable income per
worker due to the costs of natural disasters and heat waves. In the Conflict scenario,
CLC decreases income per worker by only 0.6% as more people forcibly migrate from
developing to developed countries. Changes in the world proportion of college graduates
and in the average urban share are almost identical to those obtained in the Intermediate
scenario. As far as the long-run proportion of international migrants is concerned, it
increases by 0.21% in the Intermediate scenario, against 0.27% when accounting for fast-
onset mechanisms, and 0.70% with conflicts.
Table 3 characterizes the patterns of climate migration under the Fast-onset and Con-
flict scenarios. Results can be easily compared with those obtained under the Intermediate
scenario in Table 2. Remember that over the 21st century, we predict 100 million working-
age climate migrants in our Intermediate scenario, including 60.4 million local migrants,
17.6 million interregional migrants, and 21.7 million international migrants. We obtain
very similar estimates under the Fast-onset variant: a total of 104.6 million working-
age climate migrants, including 27.7 million international migrants. Hence, fast-onset
mechanisms increase the stock of international migrants by only 6 million.
On the contrary, climate-related conflicts over resources can potentially increase mi-
gration pressures to OECD destinations. The Conflict scenario involves a total of 141.9
million working-age climate migrants, including 60.0 million local migrants, 9.6 million
interregional migrants, and 72.4 million international migrants. This results in 44.7 mil-
lion more migrants than in the Fast-onset scenario and 50.7 million more than in the
Intermediate scenario. The latter increment roughly corresponds to 0.5% of the world
population. Unsurprisingly, most of these new migrants originate from the MENA re-
gion and sub-Saharan Africa, the two regions at the highest risk of conflict according to
Abel et al. (2019), and mostly migrate to Europe. Overall, these estimates suggest that
conflicts over resources could become a key component of climate migration pressures.
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5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that climate change (CLC) will increase the income gap
between the richest and poorest countries by at least 25% over the course of the 21st
century. It will also increase extreme poverty at both the extensive and intensive margins
and force millions of adults to flee their flooded areas of residence. These CLC-related
developments create favorable conditions for increasing the internal and international
mobility of workers. In this paper, we endogenize the migration responses to CLC at
various spatial scales under current migration laws and policies. Our model relies on
consensus micro-foundations and is calibrated to match international and urbanization
data of the last 30 years, with a focus on long-haul migration from developing countries
towards OECD destinations. Depending on the climate scenario, we predict that rising
temperature and sea level will lead to voluntary and forced movements of 100 to 160
million working-age individuals during the 21st century. Adding dependent children, this
means a total of 200 to 300 million climate migrants. Climate migrants will mostly
originate from countries that have contributed the least to CLC, but experience the most
damaging effects.
In contrast with previous studies, our model allows us to disentangle forced and vol-
untary movements and to characterize the spatial structure of these mobility responses.
We find that more than 80% of climate migrants will move internally (within their region
of birth or from rural to urban regions), while 20% will opt for long-haul migration to an
OECD destination. This means that over the whole century, we roughly project 22 million
international climate migrants aged 25+ in a scenario involving +2◦ in global temperature
and +1.1m in the sea level, and 50 million climate migrants in a scenario involving +4◦
and +1.3m. Taking into account the timing of migration and migrants’ mortality, these
responses translate into average increases in the stock of international migrants of 7 to 17
million throughout the period, depending on the CLC scenario.
Hence, under constant moving costs, international migration is a costly adaptation
strategy of last resort. Far more climate migrants will move within their own countries
than across borders. This result holds when adding fast-onset mechanisms related to
extreme weather events. Accounting for the costs of natural disasters and heat waves
increases the secular stock of climate migrants by only 6 million (i.e., an average increase
in the stock of international migrants equal to +2 million per year).
In terms of policy implications, these results illustrate the difficulty of defining the
status of climate refugee. Indeed, in our Intermediate scenario, more than 80% of forcibly
displaced persons will move internally. In addition, half of non-local, climate-related move-
ments – and more than 90% of international climate-related movements – are voluntary
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and caused by climate-related deterioration of economic conditions; in other words, only
10% of international climate-related movements are due to forced displacements. CLC
is an additional factor that calls for better coherence between development and environ-
mental policies. Given the difficulty of emigrating from the poorest countries, preventive
measures are needed to encourage climate change adaptation, local disaster-risk reduction,
sustainable development in general, and urban sustainable development in particular.
Finally, we find that climate-related conflicts over resources can significantly increase
future international migration pressures. Although the link between CLC and conflict can
be hard to establish in practice,28 several studies have documented that climate change
increases the potential for conflict and violence in general, and instability in Western Asia
and the least developed countries in particular (e.g. Abel et al., 2019; Burke et al., 2015b).
Assuming climate change induces generalized and persistent conflicts in 17 countries at
risk, we roughly predict 50 million additional climate migrants aged 25+ over the 21st
century (i.e., an average increase in the stock of international migrants equal to 17 million).
Most will originate from the MENA region and sub-Saharan Africa and will migrate to
Europe. This suggests that security and humanitarian policy measures are needed if
decision-makers are to avoid climate-related humanitarian crises and additional waves of
forced displacements.
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Online Appendix
A Calibration details
A.1 Temperature scenarios
The CCKP projections are organized in 20-year climatological windows for 2020 to 2039,
2040 to 2059, 2060 to 2079, and 2080 to 2099. These projections are obtained from the
Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) distribution (Taylor et al.,
2012) which distinguishes between several scenarios for the Representative Concentration
Pathways (RCP) (Moss et al., 2010). The median-emission scenario is called RCP-4.5. In
addition, for each RCP, the CCKP provides data for 16 models obtained from different
research institutes. Figure A.1a depicts the evolution of the worldwide mean surface-
temperature predicted by each of the 16 models of the median (RCP-4.5) package. The
dashed black curve describes our baseline scenario. Overall, all models under RCP-4.5
predict an increase in temperature levels. We proceed to two adjustments before plugging
the temperature data into our model:
Firstly, the climate literature suggests that aggregate (unweighted) country levels of
temperature may not reflect accurately the impact of CLC (Dell et al., 2014). Particu-
larly in large countries with regions of heterogeneous population densities, the aggregate
measure poorly captures the intensity of the phenomenon. Hence, we weight the monthly
future temperature levels by population. To do this, we extract from the CCKP the
monthly mean air temperature levels for the climatological window for 1991 to 2015. We
weight equally the monthly observations to obtain a yearly temperature level for each
country. Furthermore, Dell et al. (2012) provide a data set with population-weighted
data on temperature levels. We compute the country-specific averages of these tempera-
ture levels for the years between 1995 and 2005. We then construct a scale factor for each
country by dividing these population-weighted temperature levels by the temperature lev-
els from the CCKP. In order to obtain future population-weighted measures, we multiply
each of the monthly temperature levels for the future 20-year climatological windows with
the country-specific scale factor.
Secondly, the OLG model described in Section 3 must be fed with data in 30-year
intervals (a period that is meant to represent the length of one generation), starting in
2010. Therefore, the last step consists in allocating the 20-year climatological windows
to fit the temporal structure of the model. We assimilate the 2040-2059 climatological
window to 2040, the 2060-2079 climatological window to 2070, and the 2080 to 2099
climatological window to 2100, respectively. In this way we obtain monthly population-
weighted levels of temperature for the 179 countries in our data set. When averaged over
all countries and months, our baseline temperature data predicts an increase in global
temperature of 2.09◦C by the end of the 21st century.29
29Under the RCP-4.5 scenario the projected anomalies range from 0.83◦C for the minimalist model of
the 16 models to 3.20◦C for the Maximalist model as illustrated on Figure A.1a.
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Figure A.1: CLC Scenarios (2010-2100)
A.2 Parameterization of the model
In this section, we describe our parameterization strategy for 145 developing countries
and for the entire set of 34 OECD countries modeled as a single entity.30 Our model
relies on consensual specifications for the production and migration technologies. How-
ever, as shown in Definition 1, it includes a large number of skill- and region-specific
parameters.31 These parameters are calibrated to match some moments. In particular,
we force our model to exactly match the recent trends in human capital accumulation,
income disparities, and population movements (including internal and international mi-
grations). We use socio-demographic and economic data for 1980 and 2010, as well as
socio-demographic prospects for 2040. Hence, we use all the degrees of freedom of the
data to identify the parameters needed. Consequently, our model is exactly identified.
In Burzyn´ski et al. (2019), we use a simplified version of this model and check the rea-
sonableness of the distribution of our calibrated parameters. We show that the identified
parameters exhibit realistic correlations with traditional explanatory variables from the
econometric literature. We also illustrate the ability of our model to match historical
mobility trends. Table A.1 summarizes the calibration outcomes.
Data. – We collect data on the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of
179 countries in 1980 and 2010. We use data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for
all countries from the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA).32 Data on the agriculture share in value added are taken from the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAOSTAT). As for the structure of the
30With the exceptions of Macao, North-Korea, Somalia and Taiwan, all countries that are not covered
by our sample have less than 100,000 inhabitants.
31There are 14 parameters by country (TFP scale factor by region, skill-bias scale factor by region,
internal migration costs for both skill groups, international migration costs for both skill groups and by
region, access to education by region, quality of education by region and 179 countries). This means
2,506 country-specific parameters.
32For a few missing observations we impute values by making use of the Maddison database and data
from the World Bank.
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resident labor force by education level and by sector, we use the estimates described in
Burzyn´ski et al. (2019). Data on wages by education level ($r,2010) are obtained from
Biavaschi et al. (2019) for the non-agricultural sector, and from the Gallup World Polls
for the agricultural sector.
We model international migration to OECD countries only. From the Database on Im-
migrants in OECD and non-OECD countries (DIOC), we extract the number of emigrants
by education level to OECD countries for all countries in our sample and for 2010. The
DIOC does not identify the region of origin of migrants (urban versus rural). However,
for the majority of countries in our sample, skill- and region-specific information on the
desire to emigrate can be extracted from the Gallup World Polls. Assuming the structure
of migration aspirations is identical to the structure of actual emigration stocks, we split
the number of emigrants to OECD countries by region of origin and by education level.
As for urbanization, net internal migration is then the difference between the ”before-
migration” population (Nr,s,2010) in 2010 and the sum of the resident population and the
international migrants (
∑
r,s(Lr,s,2010 +Mrf,s,2010)) in 2010.
To proxy the average fertility rate (n1980), we divide the total native population of
adults in 2010 (
∑
r,sNr,s,2010) by the resident population of adults in 1980 (
∑
r,s Lr,s,1980).
33
Moreover, our calibration requires data on the skill- and region-specific fertility for each
country. By construction, we have nt ≡
∑
r,s Lr,s,tnr,s,t/
∑
r,s Lr,s,t. We use the Gallup
World Polls and extract the Gallup-based average number of children per household in
urban and rural regions by skill level for 2010. We compute the fertility of the college
educated workers by fitting the sector-specific, low/high-skilled fertility differentials from
the Gallup database. In this way, we obtain the fertility rates for each country for 1980.
From 2010 onward, the number of children is endogenous. Once skill-specific fertility rates
are calibrated, we use (10) to compute the employment levels (`r,s,2010) and the skill ratio
(zr,2010) in all regions.
Technological parameters. – Output in each sector depends on the size and skill
structure of employment. To calibrate the set of technological parameters, we proceed in
two steps.
First, we calibrate the parameters affecting the private returns to higher education. For
each sector, we combine our estimates for `r,s,t with cross-country data on the income gap
between college graduates and the less educated. We calibrate the elasticity of substitution
between college graduates and less educated workers relying on existing studies. As for
the non-agricultural sector, there is a large number of influential papers that propose
specific estimates for industrialized countries (i.e., countries where the employment share
of agriculture is small). Ottaviano and Peri (2012) suggest setting σn close to 2.0. As for
the agricultural sector, it is usually assumed that the elasticity of substitution is much
larger. For example, Vollrath (2009) or Lucas (2009) assume perfect substitution between
skill groups. In line with the existing literature, we assume σn = 2 and σa = ∞. Once
the elasticities are chosen, we use our proxies for $r,2010 and zr,2010 to identify ηr,2010
from (3). Regressing the log of ηr,2010 on the log of zr,2010 yields insignificant effect in
agriculture, and a correlation of 0.38 in non-agriculture. We thus rule out the possibility
of skill-biased technical change in agriculture (κa = 0), and assume a linear technology
with a constant ηa,2010 = ηa = 1.3 for all countries and all periods. This value is given by
33There is no mortality in the model. The average fertility rate at time t, nt, should be seen as a net
population growth rate.
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the population-weighted average of $a,2010. In nonagriculture, we assume that half the
correlation between the log of ηn,2010 on the log of zn,2010 is due to the skill-bias externality
(i.e., κn = 0.19), and we calibrate ηn as a residual from (5) in each region. We find that
this scale factor is positively associated with the share of researcher in the labor force.
In the second step, we use data on income by sector in 2010 and identify the TFP levels
(Ar,t) as a residual from Equation (1). There is a clear positive relationship between TFP
and the skill ratio in both sectors. Indeed, regressing the log of Ar,t on the log of zr,t gives
a coefficient of 0.57 in the non-agricultural sector, and 0.66 in agriculture. We assume
that half the correlation between TFP and the share of college-educated workers is due
to the schooling externality (i.e., n = 0.28 and a = 0.33). We calibrate An as a residual
from (4). This scale factor exhibits realistic correlations with proxies for infrastructure
and with the cost of starting a business.
Preference parameters. – The literature indicates some common values of several
preference parameters. We assign the following values to the parameters that are time-
invariant and equal for all countries: θ = 0.25, λ = 0.5 and φ = 0.14.34 From (12) and
(13), the scale parameter of the distribution of migration tastes (µ) is the inverse of the
elasticity of bilateral migration to the wage rate. Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga
(2013) find a value between 0.6 and 0.7 for this elasticity. Hence, we use µ = 1.4.
The parameters pir and ψr,t affect fertility and education decisions. We calibrate
them to match population dynamics between 1980 and 2010, i.e., the transition from the
resident population in 1980 and the native population in 2010. From Equations (11) and
(17), the fertility rate in the model depends on the product of pirψr,t. Once fertility rates
are matched we are able to identify the product pirψr,t. We then calibrate pir and ψr,t
in order to match the educational structure of the native population in 2010, imposing
the given value to the ratio of probabilities of becoming high-skilled across regions. OLS
regressions show that the calibrated cost of education ψr,t decreases with government
spending in education, increases with the pupil-to-teacher ratio, and is greater in the
rural sector. The quality of education pir exhibits opposite correlations Burzyn´ski et al.
(2019).
As for internal migration costs, we assume there is only migration from rural to urban
regions (i.e., xan,s,t < 1 and xna,s,t = 1). We obtain internal migration costs for rural-
urban migration from Equation (13). To determine the international migration costs
(xaf,s,t and xnf,s,t), we begin by retrieving the utilities achievable abroad. We set these
utilities equal to the skill-specific weighted average utilities of the OECD countries. The
weights consist in the respective population sizes of the OECD countries. We then obtain
the international migration costs from Equation (13). In line with Delogu et al. (2018), the
calibrated costs exhibit realstic correlations with standard gravity determinants (distance,
common language, colonial links, visa restrictions). In Burzyn´ski et al. (2019), we use the
calibrated migration technology to predict the variation in the stock of migrants between
1980 and 2010, and find that our predicted variations almost coincide with the observed
ones.
To the best of our knowledge there is no information on the relative income loss
experienced by individuals displaced by floods. However, in cases of armed conflicts, Fiala
34Given the expression in (9), this assumption reflects setting the bound of the maximal number of
children equal to 7 (i.e., 14 children per couple). See Docquier et al. (2017) for a brief review of studies
using similar parameter values.
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(2015) finds that displaced households incur a loss of consumption ranging between 28%
and 35%. For Colombia, Iba´n˜ez and Moya (2006) find that a displacement is associated
with a loss of 50% of income. Kellenberg and Mobarak (2011) characterize the willingness
to pay for investments in disaster prevention to around 24% of income. We use these
studies to proxy the local relocation cost due to a climate-driven forced displacement.
Given this micro evidence, we pessimistically assume xfr◦r◦,s,t = 0.5 (i.e., relocating within
the region of birth induces an income loss equal to 50% of the lifetime utility).
Table A.1: Common and Country-Specific Parameters
Description Mean s.d. Source/Moment matches
Parameters without country variations
σn Elast. subst. in nonagr. 2.00 - Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
σa Elast. subst. in agr. ∞ - Vollrath (2009) or Lucas (2009)
n Aggregate externality in nonagr. 0.28 - Half correl. betw. lnAn,t & lnΓ
`
n,t
n Aggregate externality in agr. 0.33 - Half correl. betw. lnAa,t & lnΓ
`
a,t
κn Skill-biased externality in nonagr. 0.19 - Half correl. betw. lnΓ
η
n,t & lnΓ
`
n,t
κa Skill-biased externality in agr. 0.00 - Half correl. betw. lnΓ
η
a,t & lnΓ
`
a,t
θ Preference for children 0.25 - Docquier et al. (2017)
λ Elast. training technology 0.50 - Docquier et al. (2017)
φ Time to raise a child 0.14 - Docquier et al. (2017)
µ 1/Elast. mig. to wages 1.40 - Bertoli & Ferna´ndez-HM (2013)
xfr◦r◦,s Utility loss due to forced displ. 0.50 - Fiala (2015), Iba´n˜ez and Moya (2006)
Parameters with some country variations
An Scale factor in TFP 216,969 267,723 Residual from (4)
Aa Scale factor in TFP 89,025 320,698 Residual from (4)
Γ
η
n Scale factor in skill bias 1.878 - Residual from (3)
Γ
η
a Scale factor in skill bias 1.326 - Residual from (3)
pin Scale factor training technology 0.025 0.041 Match fertility/educ. in (11)
pia Scale factor training technology 0.043 0.142 Match fertility/educ. in (11)
ψn Education cost 13.74 67.27 Match fertility/educ. in (11)
ψa Education cost 46.22 148.98 Match fertility/educ. in (11)
xan,h Internal mig. cost, high-skilled 0.712 1.989 Match urbanization (WDI)
xan,l Internal mig. cost, low-skilled 0.928 0.163 Match urbanization (WDI)
xnf,h International mig. cost, high-skilled 0.416 4.422 Match migration data (DIOC)
xaf,h International mig. cost, high-skilled 0.829 1.065 Match migration data (DIOC)
xnf,l International mig. cost, low-skilled 0.947 0.281 Match migration data (DIOC)
xaf,l International mig. cost, low-skilled 0.985 0.066 Match migration data (DIOC)
Projections parameters. – Our parameter set is such that the model matches the
geographic disparities in income, population and human capital in 2010, and their evo-
lution between 1980 and 2010. The philosophy of our baseline projection exercise is to
predict the future trends in income, population and human capital if all parameters re-
main constant, with the exception of the parameters governing access to education. More
precisely, we constrain our baseline trajectory to be compatible with medium-term official
demographic projections, as reflected by the UN projections of the national adult popu-
lation and proportion of college graduates for 2040. Hence, we allow for country-specific
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proportional adjustments in ψr,t (r = a, n) (i.e., the same relative change in both sectors)
that minimizes the sum of squared differences in population and human capital between
the baseline simulations and the UN projections for 2040. Remember ψr,t determines the
cost of education in the region. Comparing the new levels of ψr,2010 with those obtained
in 1980 (i.e., ψr,1980), we identify a conditional convergence process in the access to ed-
ucation. We see it as a likely consequence of the Millennium Development policy. We
estimate two quadratic, region-specific convergence equations considering the US as the
benchmark frontier:
ln (ψr,t+1/ψr,t) = αr + βr ln
(
ψUSAr,t /ψr,t
)
+ γr
(
ln
(
ψUSAr,t /ψr,t
))2
. (A.1)
We obtain γa = 0.032, γn = 0.046, βa = −0.195 and βn = −0.223, where all pa-
rameters are highly significant. For subsequent years, our baseline scenario assumes a
continuation of this quadratic convergence process, in line with the new Sustainable De-
velopment Agenda. Under this assumption, Burzyn´ski et al. (2019) show that the model
simulations fit the official sociodemographic projections very well. This is a proof of
concept that such a stylized model does a good job in generating realistic projections of
population, human capital, and urbanization.
B Additional results with slow-onset mechanisms
The left panels of Table B.1 list for each of the 179 countries the income per worker in the
Intermediate scenario as well as the difference in income per worker between the Inter-
mediate and the Minimalist scenarios, and between the Maximalist and the Minimalist
scenarios for 2100. The right panel gives natives’ average emigration rates for each coun-
try under the three scenarios of Section 4.1 and for 2100. Note that in OECD countries,
changes in emigration rates are more than offset by increasing immigration rates (not
reported here). The effects need not be linear. For example, compared to the Minimalist
scenario, the emigration rate in France increases by 0.2 percentage points under the Inter-
mediate, and decreases by 0.1 percentage points under the Maximalist scenario. Note that
in OECD countries, changes in emigration rates are more than offset by increasing immi-
gration rates (not reported in Table B.1). Compared to the Minimalist scenario, Table
B.3 shows that the immigration rate to France increases by 0.5 percentage points under
the Intermediate, and decreases by 1.0 percentage point under the Maximalist scenario.
Table B.2 gives the effect of CLC on the country-wide level of income per worker for
the 20 most adversely affected countries (the ranking is based on the effect in 2100). It
documents the relative difference in income per worker between the Intermediate and the
Minimalist scenarios, and between the Maximalist and the Minimalist scenarios. The
table shows that poorer countries close to the equator experience a substantial decrease
in income per worker in the long-term.
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Table B.1: Effects on Income per Worker and Emigration Rates in 2100 (1/4)
Iso Income per worker in 2100 Emigration rates in 2100
Interm Interm/Minim Maxim/Minim Minim Interm Maxim
AFG 3,698 3.2 5.2 4.7 4.5 4.5
ALB 26,818 2.3 2.4 45.6 46.0 46.6
DZA 35,125 0.1 -1.8 8.5 8.6 8.8
AGO 22,692 -10.0 -19.8 5.6 6.4 7.5
ARG 55,540 -1.1 -4.3 3.0 3.1 3.2
ARM 18,535 14.1 26.1 33.9 32.5 31.3
AUS* 379,325 4.2 4.7 3.8 3.9 3.9
AUT* 339,813 8.0 14.4 5.2 5.0 4.8
AZE 33,184 3.1 4.8 15.8 15.8 15.9
BHS 110,197 -11.0 -23.8 19.7 20.7 22.1
BHR 131,119 -7.1 -15.3 3.1 3.3 3.5
BGD 5,580 -11.6 -23.9 1.8 2.1 2.5
BRB 74,853 -13.8 -27.5 32.1 34.2 37.4
BLR 47,806 13.6 25.4 9.7 9.3 9.0
BEL* 386,471 11.0 19.7 5.6 5.5 5.4
BLZ 17,914 -14.1 -28.0 32.3 35.6 40.0
BEN 3,081 -10.3 -21.6 1.2 1.4 1.7
BTN 20,462 -2.8 -7.2 2.3 2.3 2.3
BOL 14,992 -4.8 -12.2 7.6 8.1 8.7
BIH 24,810 4.2 6.6 25.8 24.6 23.8
BWA 43,962 -6.8 -15.0 1.6 1.7 1.8
BRA 77,814 -9.2 -20.6 1.0 1.1 1.2
BRN 299,267 -14.8 -29.4 6.4 7.3 8.4
BGR 51,942 9.1 16.0 14.8 14.5 14.3
BFA 3,847 -10.3 -20.4 0.7 0.8 1.0
BDI 496 -9.3 -17.7 0.8 0.8 0.9
KHM 2,848 -12.7 -24.3 5.6 6.8 8.6
CMR 7,479 -11.8 -24.3 3.4 3.8 4.3
CAN* 277,634 17.1 34.2 4.3 4.0 3.7
CPV 38,301 -8.6 -18.9 40.8 42.8 45.4
CAF 806 -13.0 -25.9 1.3 1.6 1.9
TCD 1,834 -11.7 -23.4 0.2 0.3 0.3
CHL* 84,839 10.0 17.7 4.1 4.0 4.0
CHN 33,910 -0.3 -0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
HKG 170,854 -8.8 -18.5 19.0 19.7 20.5
COL 81,090 -8.9 -19.5 4.3 4.6 5.1
COM 2,696 -11.8 -23.0 16.3 19.5 24.0
COG 14,677 -13.2 -26.7 3.3 3.7 4.2
COD 1,407 -11.8 -24.2 1.6 1.9 2.2
CRI 54,616 -11.0 -23.5 3.8 4.2 4.7
HRV 84,653 3.7 5.3 11.9 11.7 11.7
CUB 31,525 -15.4 -31.2 15.5 17.0 18.9
CYP 144,720 -4.3 -10.7 14.4 15.0 15.7
CZE* 163,846 17.0 33.1 4.7 4.3 4.1
CIV 3,818 -12.0 -23.7 2.3 2.7 3.3
Notes: Income per worker (level and percentage deviation from the Minimalist), emigration as percentage
of native population aged 25 to 64. The asterisks mark the 34 OECD member countries.
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Table B.1: Effects on Income per Worker and Emigration Rates in 2100 (2/4)
Iso Income per worker in 2100 Emigration rates in 2100
Interm Interm/Minim Maxim/Minim Minim Interm Maxim
DNK* 378,559 13.8 26.6 5.5 5.2 4.9
DJI 9,214 -11.9 -24.7 3.2 3.6 4.0
DOM 27,454 -16.6 -32.9 18.0 19.8 21.9
ECU 28,264 -10.9 -24.0 13.6 14.9 16.5
EGY 10,922 -0.6 -6.2 1.6 1.7 1.7
SLV 19,936 -16.0 -31.5 38.8 42.4 46.3
GNQ 9,470 -14.0 -28.3 10.8 12.1 13.9
ERI 2,113 -9.4 -19.1 7.2 7.8 8.8
EST* 136,205 12.4 24.1 10.5 9.7 9.1
ETH 1,331 -8.3 -16.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
FJI 15,634 -15.0 -29.6 37.9 41.3 45.4
FIN* 280,830 2.2 3.6 4.7 4.7 4.8
FRA* 274,992 8.0 14.1 5.1 4.9 4.8
GAB 55,546 -14.6 -29.5 3.8 4.3 4.8
GMB 2,430 -18.2 -35.9 10.3 11.6 13.3
GEO 11,801 3.9 6.8 26.3 26.4 26.5
DEU* 333,740 5.6 9.7 9.4 8.9 8.5
GHA 7,025 -16.5 -32.7 5.0 5.7 6.6
GRC* 272,062 0.6 -0.8 2.6 2.7 2.8
GRD 36,071 -17.1 -24.6 50.8 54.2 59.2
GTM 15,702 -9.0 -18.2 16.8 18.3 20.3
GIN 2,122 -9.8 -19.3 2.4 2.8 3.5
GNB 3,229 -10.1 -25.1 9.6 11.3 13.4
GUY 12,580 -14.3 -27.5 57.2 62.8 69.0
HTI 4,556 -12.9 -26.2 19.5 21.0 22.8
HND 11,976 -12.8 -26.1 19.6 21.8 24.7
HUN* 103,835 6.1 10.2 6.2 6.1 6.0
ISL* 393,815 40.9 96.6 16.6 15.4 14.4
IND 7,428 -11.9 -24.0 1.5 1.7 2.0
IDN 20,025 -12.5 -25.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
IRN 62,010 2.2 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.0
IRQ 25,839 -2.2 -6.1 7.4 7.7 7.9
IRL* 452,346 13.8 25.8 14.6 14.0 13.5
ISR* 237,257 0.7 -1.5 5.0 5.1 5.3
ITA* 357,925 2.9 3.4 6.9 6.9 6.9
JAM 21,336 -13.7 -25.9 48.4 52.3 57.1
JPN* 286,260 0.8 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0
JOR 28,054 0.1 -1.9 5.2 5.3 5.4
KAZ 39,085 1.9 3.4 31.5 32.2 32.7
KEN 7,369 -8.5 -17.1 3.4 3.5 3.7
KWT 229,316 -3.8 -8.5 4.8 5.0 5.2
KGZ 3,111 -1.2 -1.4 19.8 20.9 21.8
LAO 7,493 -9.4 -19.8 16.2 17.4 18.9
LVA 44,384 5.4 12.1 16.2 15.3 14.6
LBN 60,102 -3.1 -8.9 14.6 15.1 15.9
Notes: Income per worker (level and percentage deviation from the Minimalist), emigration as percentage
of native population aged 25 to 64. The asterisks mark the 34 OECD member countries.
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Table B.1: Effects on Income per Worker and Emigration Rates in 2100 (3/4)
Iso Income per worker in 2100 Emigration rates in 2100
Interm Interm/Minim Maxim/Minim Minim Interm Maxim
LSO 4,494 -3.2 -6.9 0.2 0.2 0.2
LBR 1,310 -15.3 -30.2 8.0 9.5 11.5
LBY 116,403 -0.9 -4.1 3.7 3.8 4.0
LTU 69,204 7.9 14.7 15.1 14.4 13.8
LUX* 604,595 8.4 14.6 8.6 8.4 8.2
MKD 22,851 3.7 5.8 20.5 20.4 20.4
MDG 2,112 -6.6 -14.7 2.3 2.4 2.6
MWI 1,619 -8.8 -18.1 0.6 0.6 0.7
MYS 62,246 -16.7 -33.1 5.3 6.0 6.8
MDV 42,646 -6.1 -21.2 1.6 2.0 2.3
MLI 2,856 -12.4 -25.0 2.9 3.3 3.8
MLT 129,087 1.1 -0.6 22.1 22.5 23.0
MRT 6,555 -9.8 -22.2 2.7 3.0 3.4
MUS 21,322 -12.9 -25.5 22.9 24.7 27.1
MEX* 76,766 -2.0 -6.4 11.3 11.7 12.3
FSM 13,498 -9.8 -19.2 35.8 41.9 49.7
MNG 19,210 15.4 30.4 3.3 3.1 2.9
MNE 40,985 3.7 5.4 4.8 4.8 4.8
MAR 18,972 -1.0 -3.9 16.2 16.6 17.1
MOZ 1,428 -8.7 -17.8 0.9 1.1 1.3
MMR 8,630 -11.3 -23.4 0.8 0.9 1.1
NAM 31,231 -8.8 -18.4 1.9 2.1 2.3
NPL 1,235 -17.3 -32.1 4.0 4.5 5.3
NLD* 451,235 6.7 11.1 4.8 4.7 4.6
NZL* 334,407 8.0 13.6 19.3 18.8 18.5
NIC 7,942 -16.8 -32.5 12.8 15.1 18.1
NER 659 -10.7 -21.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
NGA 13,969 -10.8 -21.6 1.5 1.7 2.1
NOR* 475,745 1.7 3.6 4.5 4.6 4.6
OMN 129,932 -11.0 -22.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
PAK 5,138 -6.1 -13.4 2.9 3.1 3.3
PSE 17,640 -2.2 -6.7 1.4 1.4 1.5
PAN 58,022 -13.8 -27.6 8.6 9.8 11.3
PNG 3,355 -8.1 -17.8 1.6 1.7 1.9
PRY 17,934 -11.5 -24.0 4.8 5.4 6.1
PER 42,001 7.5 11.5 6.1 6.1 6.2
PHL 12,396 -16.4 -32.6 11.8 13.2 15.1
POL* 86,600 9.3 17.1 14.7 14.1 13.6
PRT* 197,097 3.4 4.6 20.2 20.3 20.5
QAT 34,394 -7.3 -15.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
KOR* 76,315 2.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
MDA 7,867 6.5 11.3 24.6 23.9 23.5
ROU 49,314 4.7 7.9 22.8 22.6 22.5
RUS 46,992 14.3 28.0 4.1 3.7 3.4
RWA 3,182 -9.0 -17.7 1.6 1.8 1.9
Notes: Income per worker (level and percentage deviation from the Minimalist), emigration as percentage
of native population aged 25 to 64. The asterisks mark the 34 OECD member countries.
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Table B.1: Effects on Income per Worker and Emigration Rates in 2100 (4/4)
Iso Income per worker in 2100 Emigration rates in 2100
Interm Interm/Minim Maxim/Minim Minim Interm Maxim
LCA 50,268 -8.3 -16.9 23.9 26.2 29.6
VCT 45,703 -10.9 -23.0 44.8 47.4 50.7
WSM 24,116 -9.0 -17.9 48.3 52.6 58.3
STP 4,529 -19.8 -38.0 31.1 34.9 39.2
SAU 120,306 -6.5 -14.2 1.1 1.1 1.2
SEN 3,609 -10.7 -21.4 7.8 9.4 11.7
SRB 29,005 5.6 9.4 13.1 12.8 12.7
SLE 1,093 -11.8 -22.8 4.3 5.2 6.6
SGP 1,151,453 -17.0 -33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
SVK* 116,102 6.9 12.4 13.2 12.8 12.5
SVN* 222,034 7.8 13.6 4.4 4.2 4.1
SLB 8,112 -12.0 -24.3 2.3 2.9 3.8
ZAF 45,803 -2.8 -7.4 4.8 4.8 5.0
ESP* 371,685 1.8 1.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
LKA 20,759 -13.6 -26.9 6.3 7.5 9.3
SDN 8,180 -12.0 -23.9 1.1 1.3 1.6
SUR 38,188 -9.0 -19.5 46.4 50.5 54.4
SWZ 31,710 -5.8 -13.5 0.7 0.7 0.7
SWE* 271,332 1.3 3.0 5.4 5.5 5.5
CHE* 548,846 15.3 29.8 7.6 7.1 6.6
SYR 17,482 -0.4 -2.5 3.2 3.3 3.4
TJK 1,969 -0.2 0.1 17.7 18.3 18.6
TZA 2,838 -8.5 -16.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
THA 47,831 -12.5 -25.4 1.6 1.8 2.1
TLS 6,551 -10.0 -19.5 5.5 6.6 8.3
TGO 2,107 -11.3 -22.0 2.8 3.4 4.2
TON 36,927 -9.8 -20.2 57.3 60.4 64.3
TTO 174,280 -10.8 -22.0 31.4 34.3 38.5
TUN 33,124 -1.0 -4.2 8.4 8.6 8.9
TUR* 85,377 3.2 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.6
TKM 28,103 0.0 -0.9 7.5 7.6 7.7
UGA 2,492 -9.3 -17.9 1.3 1.4 1.6
UKR 24,656 8.6 15.1 9.7 9.5 9.3
ARE 551,078 -8.5 -17.8 0.6 0.7 0.8
GBR* 270,646 10.6 19.5 7.4 7.0 6.7
USA* 361,427 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7
URY 84,881 0.4 -2.9 7.8 8.1 8.5
UZB 6,010 0.4 0.6 11.9 12.1 12.3
VUT 21,728 -10.8 -21.7 4.6 5.5 6.7
VEN 64,072 -17.8 -34.9 4.8 5.3 5.9
VNM 7,839 -8.7 -20.1 7.4 8.1 9.0
YEM 8,047 -8.9 -18.6 1.1 1.2 1.3
ZMB 2,651 -9.2 -18.2 1.3 1.5 1.6
ZWE 6,412 -7.2 -15.5 6.5 6.8 7.1
Notes: Income per worker (level and percentage deviation from the Minimalist), emigration as percentage
of native population aged 25 to 64. The asterisks mark the 34 OECD member countries.
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Table B.2: Most Adversely Affected Countries in 2040 and 2100 (Percentage Deviation
from the Minimalist Scenario)
Country Interm/Minim Country Maxim/Minim
2040 2100 2040 2100
1 Sao Tome and Principe -20.6 -19.8 Sao Tome and Principe -34.6 -38.0
2 Gambia -11.7 -18.2 Gambia -25.0 -35.9
3 Venezuela -13.8 -17.8 Venezuela -28.0 -34.9
4 Nepal -15.9 -17.3 Singapore -28.7 -33.3
5 Grenada -13.4 -17.1 Malaysia -28.7 -33.1
6 Singapore -14.3 -17.0 Dominican Republic -27.3 -32.9
7 Nicaragua -15.3 -16.8 Ghana -31.8 -32.7
8 Malaysia -14.3 -16.7 Philippines -30.7 -32.6
9 Dominican Republic -13.5 -16.6 Nicaragua -30.2 -32.5
10 Ghana -15.9 -16.5 Nepal -31.1 -32.1
11 Philippines -15.3 -16.4 El Salvador -27.8 -31.5
12 El Salvador -14.0 -16.0 Cuba -26.0 -31.2
13 Cuba -12.7 -15.4 Liberia -36.3 -30.2
14 Liberia -18.6 -15.3 Fiji -24.7 -29.6
15 Fiji -12.0 -15.0 Gabon -25.8 -29.5
16 Brunei Darussalam -14.4 -14.8 Brunei Darussalam -29.0 -29.4
17 Gabon -12.5 -14.6 Equatorial Guinea -30.4 -28.3
18 Guyana -14.2 -14.3 Belize -29.7 -28.0
19 Belize -14.2 -14.1 Panama -26.7 -27.6
20 Equatorial Guinea -14.5 -14.0 Barbados -25.7 -27.5
Notes: Simulation results based on the moderate CLC scenarios defined in Section 2.1. Ranking based
on income per worker in 2100.
Table B.3 reports emigration and immigration rates by region. The top panel shows
that the mean emigration rates from the developing world will increase during the 21st
century. The regional emigration rates will be multiplied by a factor of 1.5 to 2. This can
be explained by the rise in education (highly educated people are more mobile) and by
CLC. To identify the effect of CLC, the last two columns compare the predictions of the
two alternative CLC scenarios in 2100. Comparing the Intermediate to the Minimalist
and Maximalist scenarios, CLC affects the emigration rates from Latin America and, to
a lesser extent, from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. However, on average, CLC multiplies
emigration rates by a factor of 1.05, which is a small fraction of the total rise in emigration
rates.
The bottom panel documents the change in the proportion of immigrants in selected
OECD countries. We assume emigrants to the OECD aggregate entity are allocated across
countries on the basis of the dyadic shares of 2010. Over the 21st century and at current
migration policies and laws, the average share of immigrants should be multiplied by a
factor of 1.5 in settlement countries (the US, Canada and Australia), and should increase
twofold in Europe. These changes are mostly explained by demographic imbalances and
by the progress in education. Comparing the CLC scenarios for 2100, we show that the
contribution of CLC to increasing immigration is small. CLC explains about 1/20 of
the total change in the share of immigrants in the population. The rise in the sea level
induces minor effects on international migration, as most of the forcibly displaced people
will relocate locally.
Table B.4 lists the countries with the highest emigration responses to CLC for 2040
and 2100. In 2040, countries that send the greatest numbers of emigrants abroad under
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Table B.3: International Migration Rates by Region and by Country
Intermediate Minim Maxim
2010 2040 2070 2100 2100 2100
Emigration rates
Latin America 3.8 5.3 6.1 6.7 6.3 6.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.2
MENA 2.8 4.0 4.3 4.6 4.4 4.6
Asia 1.1 1.9 2.5 3.0 2.8 3.0
OECD 4.7 5.6 5.2 4.7 4.8 4.7
Immigration rates
United States 16.0 21.4 23.0 23.1 22.7 23.6
Canada 18.7 26.5 28.5 28.4 28.2 28.6
Australia 24.9 29.4 29.2 28.1 27.8 28.5
European Union 12.1 18.6 21.9 23.6 23.2 24.1
EU15 13.6 20.3 23.3 24.6 24.2 25.1
Germany 15.0 22.5 25.4 26.4 26.1 26.8
France 12.2 18.8 20.5 22.1 21.6 22.6
United Kingdom 14.6 22.2 25.4 26.6 26.3 26.9
Italy 10.9 17.2 20.6 22.5 21.9 23.1
Spain 14.0 20.6 23.3 24.3 23.8 24.8
Notes: Simulation results based on the moderate scenarios defined in Section 2.1. Emigration as a percent
of native population aged 25 to 64, immigration as a percent of resident population aged 25 to 64.
the more pessimistic scenarios are usually those with higher fractions of forcibly displaced
workers and/or those located close to the equator. By the end of the century, these
general results do not markedly change. Some of the small Caribbean islands are among
the group of the most adversely affected economies in 2100.35
C Modeling conflicts
To account for conflicts over ressources, we follow Dao et al. (2018) who show that severe
armed conflicts increase the emigration stock twofold in the long-term. In our model,
migration decisions from region r◦ are governed by:
Nr◦,s,t = Mr◦r◦,s,t +Mr◦r,s,t +Mr◦F,s,t
= Mr◦r◦,s,t(1 +mr◦r,s,t +mr◦F,s,t),
where mr◦F,s,t = (vF,s,t/vr◦,s,t)
1/µ(1 − xr◦F,s,t)1/µ denotes the migrant-to-stayer ratio, and
Nr◦,s,t is the native (pre-migration) population (given at the beginning of each period).
We can express the emigrant stock as:
Mr◦F,s,t = mr◦F,s,tMr◦r◦,s,t =
mr◦F,s,tNr◦,s,t
1 +mr◦r,s,t +mr◦F,s,t
.
35Interestingly, Micronesia is among the top positively affected countries in the short-run and the top
negatively affected countries in the long-run.
59
Table B.4: Largest Changes in the Stock of Emigrants (Percentage Deviation from the
Minimalist Scenario)
Country Interm/Minim Country Maxim/Minim
2040 2100 2040 2100
1 Guyana 16.9 -15.6 Guyana 35.1 -34.5
2 Suriname 17.3 -13.0 Suriname 32.2 -26.1
3 Grenada 13.5 -9.5 Tonga 16.1 -18.3
4 Tonga 7.8 -8.9 Samoa 24.2 -16.7
5 Russia -10.3 -8.0 Jamaica 23.4 -15.7
6 Micronesia 23.8 -6.5 Grenada 21.8 -14.8
7 Samoa 10.6 -6.5 Micronesia 44.8 -14.7
8 Jamaica 10.9 -6.3 Russia -18.3 -14.4
9 Czech Republic -9.3 -5.8 El Salvador 24.8 -11.2
10 Mongolia -9.4 -5.2 Mongolia -16.6 -9.9
11 Latvia -0.2 -4.4 Czech Republic -15.9 -9.5
12 Lesotho -6.5 -4.3 Latvia -4.4 -7.6
13 El Salvador 11.4 -4.2 Cape Verde 19.2 -7.4
14 Cape Verde 11.0 -4.1 St Vinc & Gren 19.8 -6.9
15 Estonia -9.1 -3.8 Lesotho -10.2 -6.6
16 Denmark -8.9 -3.8 Estonia -15.9 -6.3
17 Albania 6.1 -3.7 Denmark -15.5 -6.1
18 St Vinc & Gren 10.4 -3.4 Canada -24.1 -5.7
19 Lithuania -3.7 -3.2 Lithuania -8.0 -5.6
20 Afghanistan -4.3 -3.0 Fiji 24.0 -5.5
Notes: Simulation results based on the moderate scenarios defined in Section 2.1. Ranking based on
2100.
Everything else equal, we constrain Mr◦F,s,t to increase by a factor of 2 after the
conflict (i.e. M r◦F,s,t = 2Mr◦F,s,t). Assuming that conflicts affects symmetrically (i) high-
and low-skilled workers and (ii) it all regions leaves the relative attractiveness of rural and
urban areas unchanged (i.e. mr◦r,s,t is constant). We have to find the new level of mr◦F,s,t
that is compatible with M r◦F,s,t. The solution is:
mr◦F,s,tNr◦,s,t
1 +mr◦r,s,t +mr◦F,s,t
=
2mr◦F,s,tNr◦,s,t
1 +mr◦r,s,t +mr◦F,s,t
=⇒ mr◦F,s,t = 2(1 +mr◦r,s,t)mr◦F,s,t
1 +mr◦r,s,t −mr◦F,s,t = Zr
◦F,s,tmr◦F,s,t
Considering that the effect of the conflict is governed by a change in migration costs
and net amenities (xr◦F,s,t → xr◦F,s,t), this requires:
(1− xr◦F,s,t) = (1− xr◦F,s,t)Zµr◦F,s,t.
D Additional results with fast-onset mechanisms and
conflicts
In Section 4.2, we start from the Intermediate scenario and enrich it with additional mech-
anisms related to fast-onset weather shocks and conflicts over resources. The aggregate
impact of CLC is presented in Table D.1, which gives the average effects on the world
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economy and by regions. The structure is identical to that of Table 1. The values in
bold characters are the projections obtained in the Minimalist scenario, involving con-
stant temperature and sea levels. The values below are the variations induced by the
Fast-onset and Conflict scenarios, expressed as percentage deviation from the Minimalist
scenario (for GDP and population) or as percentage points of variation (for the share of
college graduates, the urban share, or the international emigration rate). The bottom
lines of this table give the worldwide average responses. Therefore, the Conflict scenario
is a conjunction of slow-onset, fast-onset and conflict mechanisms. This conflict scenario
would then represent the most pessimistic case for the Intermediate projection of global
temperatures.
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“Sur quoi la fondera-t-il l’économie du monde 
qu’il veut gouverner? Sera-ce sur le caprice de 
chaque particulier? Quelle confusion! Sera-ce 
sur la justice? Il l’ignore.” 
Pascal
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recherches sur le développement international aims to 
promote a fuller understanding of international economic 
development and the factors that influence it.
Contact
www.ferdi.fr
contact@ferdi.fr
+33 (0)4 73 17 75 30
